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Abstract
The future of the economy of Trinidad and Tobago is
upon the exploitation of theheavily dependent
. ' t s continental shelf.
hydrocarbon resources 1n 1
. t th VenezuelanTrinidad's geographical proxim1ty 0 e
same continental shelf in areas not delimited by the
1942 Gulf of Faria Treaty. The continental shelves of
I 't ect and these areasBarbados and Grenada a so 1n ers
have not been delimited and defined by any agreement.
The current expansion of the exploration and
exploitation of crude oil and natural gas have raised
several problems within recent years. This thesis
will focus attention to the legal problems, most of
which stem from the method used in boundary
delimitation.
Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago are parties to the
1958 Geneva Convention on the continental Shelf.
Venezuela did so with specific reservations with
respect to the articles which provide for
delimitation as they relate to the Gulf of Faria and
surrounding areas. Venezuela has not signed the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention, because of its
reservations to the clauses relative to delimitation.
Under the 1982 Convention no reservation can be made
under any of the articles. Trinidad and Tobago,
Barbados and Grenada all signed the 1982 Convention;
i1
Trinidad and Tobago has also ratified this
convention.
This thesis will suggest a delimitation of the
maritime boundaries between Trinidad and Venezuela,
Barbados and Grenada. The criteria used are special
circumstances (i.e. economic dependence) and the
precedents set by the International Court of Justice
and other International Tribunals.
This thesis is divided into six chapters:
In Chapter 1 the importance of the oil industry to
the economy of Trinidad and Tobago is considered.
Chapter 2 focuses attention on the economy of the
neighbouring countries i.e. Venezuela's oil industry
and the Barbados and Grenada tourist industry.
Chapter 3 discusses the concept of the continental
shelf. The 1942 Gulf of Paria Treaty is also
analyzed.
Chapter 4 introduces the study areas in which the
boundary lines will be delimited. The maritime
practices and possible approaches to delimitation of
Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago are discussed.
In Chapter 5 the terms "equity" and "special
circumstances" are discussed. The geographical,
geological and economic charateristic are considered.
Four cases are reviewed in which economic dependence
is used in reaching a decision
In Chapter 6 the boundary lines are constructed in
iii
the study areas and the methods used are analyzed.
The potential exists for a dispute to arise in any
undelimited boundary region, especially when the
countries are aware of the economic value of the area
resulting from petroleum development. Relations
between Trinidad and Tobago and its neighbouring
countries are good at present; therefore this is an
opportune time to negotiate a bilateral
delimiting the common areas between
treaty
these
neighbouring states.
iv
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INTRODUCTION:
Maritime boundary delimitations have increased as
a result of the greater number and diversity of
possible boundaries arising from the seaward
expansion of coastal state jurisdiction. In the
1960's we saw the increasing worldwide demand for
ocean resources, such as offshore oil and gas and
fisheries. This resulted in countries unilaterally
extending their offshore claims, partially to secure
a resource base, and partially for security.
Consequently, the number and importance of maritime
boundaries increased.
Alternative rules and principles which should be
applied to maritime boundaries have been discussed at
the Hague in 1930, at Geneva in 1958 and at the
UNCLOS III conference from 1973 to 1982. The
International Court of Justice has also decided
several maritime boundary cases, for example the
North Sea case 1969, but despite this, there is still
much ambiguity as to what appropriate methodology
should be used in order to delimit a maritime
boundary. Consequently, there is considerable
leverage for interpretation of the law, which remains
as one of the controversial issues in the 1982 Law of
the Sea Convention.
As a result of this, a maritime boundary dispute
may persist for many years. This could bring about
1
delays in the exploration of the resources of the
particular disputed area. This is especially true in
the case of Trinidad and Tobago, where the outcome of
one particular bilateral agreement could affect the
boundary of a third country which may not be party to
the negotiation. For example a bilateral agreement
between Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados could affect
Grenada who is not party to the agreement.
In ancient days, little or no importance was
attached to the sea-bed, and there was no burning
desire to control it. However, with the growth of
civilization, communication and trade, and with the
development of science and technology capable of
exploiting the resources of the seabed and ocean
floor, the sea is florishing with unprecendented
legal conflicts. (1)
At present the law of the sea is in the process of
drastic change. In the past, the sea was the subject
of political and military rivalry; but today economic
considerations play an over-riding influence due to
mUltiplicity of uses of the marine environment. Due
to this increased activity, conflicts between
different users are increasing. Traditional maritime
freedoms are being questioned by coastal states .
Emerging claims are prolific. Past concessions have
become unrealistic and the public order of the sea is
being' vigorously challenged. The resultant effect is
2
that many of the existing rules are becoming
obsolete. (2)
As stated by Dr. Kaldone G. Nweihed, delimitation
of maritime space is the direct outcome of two
obvious situations: contiguity vicinity (sharing a
boundary) and multiplicity (more than one boundary)
of political sovereignties within the area in common.
The first situation becomes more evident in
semi-enclosed seas vis-a-vis continental coasts on
open ocean space while the second is the result of
complex historic processes in which economics,
geopolitics, strategy, social relations and other
factors are involved. The Caribbean region identifies
with both situations. (3)
The literature on delimitation is fairly scant, in
comparison to that available on other related issues
of the law of the sea, other than the precise
articles contained in the 195~ Geneva conventions
dealing with delimitation, and the 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention. The other main sources which the
investigator draws upon are jurisprudence and state
practice.
The method that will be used will be inductive:
individual cases are studied on their own merit and
thus, certain principles and methods are singled out
to be compared and classified.
In quantitative terms about 100 maritime
3
boundaries have been settled globally. Thus in
qualitative terms, the world community enjoys the
benefit of several test cases and a lot of examples
where maritime delimitation has been successfully
achieved in certain delicate areas at reasonable
cost.
Orderly and rational offshore resource development
requires that there be precise definition of the area
in which such developments may occur, or else, a
joint development scheme set up between the countries
involved. Uncertainity over ownership or title can be
a major deterrent to resource exploration and
development.
Where the continental shelf or other maritime
jurisdiction zones of neighbouring states overlap,
and they frequently do in semi-enclosed seas,
delimitation of maritime boundaries between zones is
required in order to establish the precision and
certainity necessary for marine resource uses.
In this thesis, the author will try to delimit the
maritime boundaries between Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela, Grenada and Barbados. The criteria that
will be used for delimitation are "special
circumstances," i.e., economic dependence of Trinidad
and Tobago on offshore oil as opposed to Venezuela's
larger reserves on land, in the Gulf of Maracaibo,
and in the orinoco oil Belt region. In the case of
4
Barbados and Grenada tourism and agriculture are
their economic base. Historically little or no
exploration of oil was carried out by either Barbados
or Grenada, also there is no infrastructure present
in both these countries for oil refining. In the
Anglo-Nowegian Fisheries case (1951), "special
circumstances" was justified in international law.
The court in this case recognised, the economic
interest of the coastal fisheries to Norway.
In the last two national budget presentations in
Trinidad and Tobago, it was emphasized that oil
remains the backbone of the country's economy. (4)
This industry has played a critical role in the
economic development of the country over the past
decade, as the principle source of foreign exchange
and fiscal revenue for financing the massive
improvements undertaken in the country's social and
economic infrastructure. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that if the equidistant method is used
to delimit the maritime boundaries off the east,
north and part of the south coast of Trinidad and
Tobago, the economy will lose more, as opposed to,
what will be gained if special circumstances are
used, (special circumstances meaning: to take into
consideration the social, economic and
political-economic dependence of oil revenue to
sustain the economy of Trinidad and Tobago.)
5
Under international law, the basic obligation with
respect to delimitation of unsettled maritime
boundaries is that the boundary be fixed by agreement
between the nations involved. (5)
6
Chapter 1: Trinidad and Tobago oil Industry
Geography:
The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is a
two-island nation located in the southeastern
Caribbean Sea, off the northeast coast of Venezuela,
on the continental shelf of South America. It is
believed that Trinidad was once a part of the South
American mainland, and Tobago a few miles northeast
of Trinidad is part of a sunken mountain chain
related to the continent. (1) Its areal size is nearly
2,000 sq. mIs, (5,000 sq km.) - located approximately
between 100 00' Nand 11°35'N latitude and 60 0 3dw
and 62° OO'W longitude. The sedimentary oil prospect
area includes some 1,600 sq mls. (4,000 sq km.)
onshore, and 11,300 sq. mls., (29,000 sq km.)
offshore to a water depth of about 600 feet.
(200 m).(2) See Map 1.
Geology:
Trinidad is geologically a detached part of
the South Americian continent, (3) separated from it
by the Gulf of Paria, an oval-shaped body of water
with narrow straits on the north west and south east
bearing respectively the picturesque names of the
Dragons Mouths and the Serpents Mouth.
The geology of Trinidad is closely related to
that of east Venezuela, since the southern part of
?
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the island is a continuation of the Maturin Basin,
while the northern range of mountains is a
continuation of the Venezuelan Andes. The "basement"
here is probably composed of the northward-slanting
South American "shield", with its intensely folded
metamorphic rock, and with the minerals arranged in
layers. (4)
Trinidad is positioned at the mouth of the
Orinoco river and according to Van Andel & Postma
(1954), the islands of Trinidad and Tobago and their
surrounding continental shelf form part of the shelf
of the greater marine orinoco region. (5)
The east-west trend of the northern range is
deceptive, since the general structural trend is
really northeast-southwest. The direction agrees with
the average strike of the pre-Oligocene beds both in
Barbados and along the north of Venezuela as far as
Puerto Cabello. (6) (See Map 2, 3 and Fig .1).
Trinidad is characterized by an extremely
intricate system of folding and faulting. Thrusting
seems to have come from both north and south, so that
the least deformed portion is a central strip with
closely folded and broken beds on either side. The
differential folding intensity may also be related to
the age of the beds, since, with almost continuous
folding and faulting movements in action, the most
9
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The Petroleum Geology
Trinidad
Map 2:
IOt.lllIS
. Miocene &Pnocene
Ollqocene •Eocene
:~;;:; "'('SOIOIC
• Mud Volcanoes
... 0,1 Fields
TRINIDAD B.W.!.
GENERALISED GEOLOGY
Generalized Geology
of Trinidad
(B.TT. and ocher>, 19~8)
paleogeographic map
of Trinidad During Ulte MiOCene
TlITle Map 3:
11
12
Figure 1:
-_..-
~
.I
c;t:<)U)(;!C TI .'\\E SCALE
4"Wn\
I~et til
"I,u." ,"><"' ·nA.... "feU ;
I
-I - "000-
-
- _000
.JDOOQOO
-
"caua.
-CCU'O:u>,L "ODIDQO
'-
- .000000
. " ,:'1."-
' -
-
-
.. 000000
. '
.~.. ..:... . ; .. ;.. ....-_ . . .
.
.... ' .. ......-.-
-
..
" .._.
.~
n __
-
' It__
.;..-c
- '.QIDIlIoae.
- I.CIa""
-
,
a.oaaaDQ
-1 _e-
t " OOOD aaa
-
V
I a-e-
-
)It aooaao
-
_000_
- -a,.."
-
.
__olIo
e-
__OlIO
~
....--
:
-
..
-
Source: Webster's II Dict~onary~
.
affected beds would be those which have been longest
sUbjected to these forces.
An Inventory Of Resources:
Hydrocarbons are normally found in sandstone
reservoirs, but are also found in carbonate
(limestone and dolomite) reservoirs at depths of
appoximately 1,000 to 15,000 feet, either in the form
of crude oil, or natural gas. Many of the natural gas
deposits contain very light crude oil called
condensates. (7)
Trinidad and Tobago is a geologically ideal
state, in terms of the presence of source rocks that
generate crude petroleum. However, two major regional
faults subdivide this essentially petroliferous
region into different provinces that have some
striking differences. Off the north coast of
Trinidad, the sedimentary rock cover is relatively
thin, and this is underlain by a thick sequence of
metamorphosed basement rock. In the southern part of
Trinidad, the major oil fields of the past have been
identified in mUlti-layer sandstone reservoirs that
extend westward into the Gulf of Paria, while off the
East Coast extensive but somewhat younger sediments
stretch beyond the continental shelf.(S)
All three provinces have abundant deposits of
petroleum, the type and frequency of these deposits
13
varying according to the area's geological age and
the environment in which the rocks were deposited.
Offshore Exploration and Geology:
Intensive offshore exploration has been
carried on off the coast of Trinidad in recent years,
resulting in a number of important discoveries of oil
and gas in Miocene sandstone reservoirs. The first of
the offshore oil accumulations to be developed was
Soldado, which lies off the southwest coast, and
produced 13.5 million barrels in 1981.(9} The first
success on the east coast was Point Radix - near
Mayaro. This discovery was made in 1968, and other
oil accumulations have subsequently been found in
this area.
The Teak offshore oilfield lies about 25
nautical miles to the southeast of Trinidad. It was
discovered in 1969 and put into production in 1972.
The structure is a broad anticline in the eastern
part of the east Venezuelan Tertiary basin along a
compressional fold belt related to the Caribbean and
South American tetonic plates. (10), See Map 4.
It was at one time thought that the oil in
Trinidad was related in orgin to the lignites which
occur in the upper Tertiary formation. However,
nearly all these lignites have since been proved to
14
....
........-
Table I
-
: TR INIDAD A/() TOOAGO : P£TROLElI4 REVeNUE IN THE FISCAL AND BALANCE Of PAYMENTS ACCOUNTS
1912 1914 1915 1916 1971 1918 1919 1980 1961 1962 1983 1984
Crude 011 Production
I_II lion borrels)
51.2 68.1 18.8 11.5 83.6 83.8 18.3 17 .4 69.1 64.6 58.4 61.9
Centrel Government Revenue
ITTS .111 ion '
.
Petroleu. Revenue, 85.1 966.0 1.299.5 1,426.4 1,182.6 1,118,4 2,341.5 4,1l6.5 4,253.0 3,311,2 2,485,1 2,115.3
Totol Revenun 380.4 1,180.0 1,668.1 2,126,1 2,913.4 3.052.1 4,032,5 6,433.3 1,099.9 1,061,5 6.556.2 6,498.3
I 01 Totol 20.6 69.0 69.0 60.3 60.0 56.3 58,2 64~3 59.9 46.9 31.9 41,8
Value 01 Herchondl,e export" F.O,B.
(USS _II lion )
export, 01 Crude 011
ond Petroleua Product' 139.9 129.0 160.6 851.0 91l.9 1.014.8 1,393.1 2,226.2 2.201.9 1,814,2 1,111.0 1,695.5
Totol Herchandlse exports 261.5 933,2 931.9 1,011.8 1,119 .3 1,226.5 1,649.3 2,541.1 2,601.8 2,224.8 2,108,3 2,115,0
101 Totel 52.3 18.1 81.6 83.6 71.5 82.1 84.5 81.6 84.4 81.5 81.2 110.2
Source: Min istry o£ Energy and Natural Resources . ,
~
\JI
lie stratigraphically above the oil reservoir beds
and to be separated from them by unconformities. (11)
In 1984, petroleum-related and petrochemical
products contributed 40% of the gross domestic
product, and also comprised about 80% of the total
merchandise handled in the export trade. (12) Thus as
far as the international public image of Trinidad is
concerned, the economy is identified largely with
petroleum. See Table 1.
The energy sector of Trinidad, a nation of
1.2 million people, is based on two primary energy
sources, oil and gas, and is predominantly export
16
oriented. This sector has been the dominant force in
the country's economic development, and the country's
economic performance has been closely tied to trends
in international energy prices. During 1974-81,
dramatic increases in government oil revenues
occurred as a result of increased oil output and the
rapid increase in world oil prices. This increase in
revenue fueled a growth in gross domestic product of
over 6% per annum, or more than double the level
during the previous eight years. (13)
Receipts from the petroleum sector provided
an average of about 42% of Central Government
revenues. (Table 1), and Central Government
expenditure became the dominant influence in the
economy. At the height of the oil boom, export
revenues from crude oil and petroleum products sales
reached annually about U.S. $2.2 billion. (14)
Why Offshore Oil?
The volume of oil production from 1908 to
1967 indicates the stagnation of land production
during 1939 to 1953, and the relative importance of
marine production in the 1960's, (Fig 2). In 1967 for
example, marine production contributed 25 million
barrels, or nearly 40% of an overall total of 64.9
million barrels. (15)
In fact, between 1934 and 1960 only two
17
significant new land based fields were discovered.
Given the peculiar geological characteristic of
Trinidad's onshore geology, (ie. comprised of sand
and mUltiple faulting rather than large continuous
blocks.) (16) and the consequent tendency to rapid
decline in well productivity, the failure to find new
land based reserves and the limited contribution made
by the various secondary recovery methods employed
would have had serious consequences for the economy
had it not been for the discovery of the Soldado
Marine fields in 1954.
There are both direct and indirect economic
implications any increase in national economic
activity and of government revenues in such economies
as that of Trinidad and Tobago is relatively narrow
based. When the economic base is petroleum the swing
can be dramatic, and the psychological implications
considerable.
Futhermore, the income and revenue flowing
from oil lead to the undertaking of development
projects and to a pattern of government spending that
generates a lasting and insistent demand for more
current expenditures to sustain and service projects
which are not usually self-financing. Any reduction
in petroleum production and therefore in revenue
(given a fixed level of prices), not only adversely
affects plans for expanding the base of the economy,
18
but threatens the very existence of projects,
(economic and social), already began.
History Of The Oil Industry:
The development of the local petroleum
industry was initiated by the British during the
first quarter of this century, when Trinidad was
still a crown colony of Britain. British capital was
channelled into the petroleum of this territory, not
only as a source of investment, but also because
Britain needed the resource to fuel her expanding
fleet. For many years Trinidad ranked as the leading
oil producer in the British Commonwealth. Today it
produces .5% of the total world production of oil.
(17)
The Trinidad oil industry was fairly well
established by 1914 with some twelve operating
companies producing a total of one million barrels a
year, and employing around 1,200 persons. (18)
Interest in Trinidad's oil prospects
continued after World War I, and in 1920, as many as
forty companies were actively exploring for oil.
However, the international economic climate reduced
the flow of capital into Trinidad, which resulted in
a slowdown in exploration programs. The few oil
companies able to survive during the economic
19
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In 1937, a major geophysical exploration
program was initiated in Trinidad, as seismic and
gravity surveys were employed to find the deeper
oil-bearing structures. In 1942, new down-hole
logging tools were introduced in the effort to find
oil. (19)
Interest in expanding the search for oil
resources in the offshore areas was restrained by the
lack of an agreed upon maritime boundary between
Venezuela and Trinidad. A common boundary was
established by the treaty of 1942. In 1952, an oil
exploration concession in the Gulf of Paria was
granted to a major oil company. After extensive
geological and geophysical surveys, the first
offshore well was drilled in 1954, at a site ninteen
miles southwest of Port-of-Spain. The well was
drilled to a depth of 6,841 ft and found natural gas.
Later in 1954, the Solado oilfield was discovered in
the Gulf of Paria about 8.5 miles west of the onshore
Point Fortin field. The Solado field provided the
bulk of Trinidad's production for many years. (20)
In 1960, interest was shown in the east coast
on the assumption that since the west coast and Gulf
could be much more prolific than the land area, the
possibility existed that the east coast would prove
to be even more so. In 1961, the Pan American oil
Company (it was changed to Amoco, Trinidad), secured
an oil company license over an area covering 2
million acres, that includes almost the whole east
coast . The terms of the original license granted to
Amoco, prescribed that at least 25% of the licensed
area should be surrendered within five years, and an
additional 25% should be surrendered in the
subsequent five years. (21)
In 1968 Amoco found the first commercial oil
and gas on the east coast. Additional exploratory and
production drilling is being carried out in the areas
currently held under license by Amoco and Tesero oil
companies. A great deal of interest has been
expressed by many different oil firms in the open
acreage of the eastern continental shelf of Trinidad
and Tobago.
In 1969, at the request of the government of
Trinidad and Tobago, the united Nations carried out
exploration work on the north coast in search of
22
petroleum. The full seismic data resulting from the
survey was made available at a price to any firm that
was interested. The firms were given a resonable
period in which to assess the data and to submit
their bids for specfic blocks. The area had been
divided into rectangular blocks each comprising
appoximately 82,920 acres. Each successful bidder was
to make provision for the National Petroleum Company
as partner; this was and still remains an important
requirement of all new concessions granted by the
government. (22), See Map 5.
In the mid 1970's, the offshore continental
shelf area north of Trinidad was awarded to five
different companies for exploration purposes. six
wells were drilled to evaluate these offshore tracts
during 1971.
Sucessful field delin~ation wells were
drilled about fifty miles off Galeota point by
Texaco-Trinidad Inc. Originally discovered in 1977,
the well is located at water depth of 300 to 500
ft. (23)
The Trinidad and Tobago oil Company Ltd.
drilled a successful well, "The Hibiscus," off the
north coast of Trinidad, where there is a production
of 12 million cubic feet of natural gas per day. The
23
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area north of Trinidad and west of Tobago has been
considered as having a high risk potential, because
of limited information. This area is also sUbjected
to the resolution of sovereignty between Trinidad and
Tobago and Barbados and Grenada.
In 1980-1981, another seismic survey of open
acreage off the north and east coasts of Trinidad was
undertaken. The data were processed and interpreted
in 1983/84 and put up for sale in mid year 1984 at
TT$l. 2 million per package. The sale closed in
mid-1985, at the close the bids were evaluated. (24)
SUbject to prevailing market conditions, and
perceptions of the future of the market, new acreage
is expected to be awarded towards the end of 1987.
Currently, a team of officals is reviewing the
proposed terms and conditions of a model production
sharing contract under which such acreage may be
25
leased. The ultimate objective of this entire
exercise is to stimulate exploration activity and
eventually generate future production in the deeper
marine areas off the north and east coast.
At the end of 1984, the total annual
production stood at 62,042,000 barrels . The table
below reflects the steady increase in the nation's
26
average production from 1974 - 1978, but a decrease
in production from 1979 - 1985.
Table 2 Trinidad And Tobago Average Crude oil
Production in 000 barrels).
Year Total Marine Prod. Marine
as % of Total
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
68,136
78,621
77627
83620
83778
78258
77618
69107
64619
58344
62042
49,346
63,525
61325
67135
67206
61096
60510
53310
49334
44567
48321
72.4
80.8
78.9
80.4
80.2
78.1
78.0
77.1
76.3
76.4
77.8
(Source: Central Statistical Office, Trinidad and Tobago
1986. )
Marine production accounts for an approximate
78% average of the total output as the above figure
shows, and there is every indication that this upward
trend in production will continue.
Since 1981 this industry has been in decline.
(above table).
Internationally, demand has weakened, prices
of both crude and refined products have fallen, and
substantial refinery capacity throught the world has
been shut in or operated with reduced capacity.
Locally, the decline in crude production
which started in late 1978 continued through to 1983.
The operating companies, no doubt affected by the
international developments, proceeded to rationalize
their operations and cut back expenditures.
In addition, the overall performance of the
industry was affected by the protracted negotiations
involving the future role of Texaco in Trinidad &
Tobago; Tesoro's offer for sale of its shares in
Trinidad - Tesoro Company (25); and the need to
follow the precise requirement of the level of
taxation in the light of oil price decreases.
Where, therefore, one may justifiably ask, is
oil production heading in 1987? For the first time
since 1978, an increase in production has been
recorded; annual production which stood at the all
time high of 83.8 million barrel in 1978 declined
steadily to 58.3 million barrels in 1983. In 1984,
however, there was a 6.3% increase in production over
the 1983 figure of 58.3 million barrels. (see table
2)
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Amoco is the largest oil producer operating
off the east coast of Trinidad. (Table 3). Texaco's
onshore operation has been the other major fully
private sector oil operation, but in March 1985,
Texaco's onshore assets were transferred to the
government along with the Pointe a Pierre refinery.
Both Texaco's former onshore assets and the refinery
(except its marine operations) now are managed by
Trinidad and Tobago oil Co. (Trintoc). With the
additional acquistion of Tesoro's share in the
Trinidad - Tesoro joint venture in November 1985, all
onshore holdings except for the very small holdings
of Premier Consolidated now are in government
hands. (26)
REFINING:
Apart from developing the exploitation of the
nation's crude oil resources, British interests also
built up the refining arm of the industry which is
now the dominant feature of local petroleum
operations. (Table 4)
As stated in the 1969 Petroleum Act the
earliest leases required a concessionaire to provide
refinery capacity for at least 50% of its crude
output, within two years after attaining certain
levels of production, which are arbitrarily fixed for
each lease.
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. Table 4:
TRINIDAD AN> TOBAGO
PROOUCTiOH ~ m.a: OIL By COf>ANY 1975 - 1984
(Thou.and barrel. per day)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Aaoco 124.7 117.s 135.5 137.7 120.6 120.0 103.0 92.9 81.7 90.1
TrlMar 47.9 47.8 46.3 44.4 44.2 39.7 37.4 38.0 37.1 38.1
Trlnldad-Tnoro 17.8 18.5 19.0 20.4 21.5 24.9 24.3 22.7 21.4 22.6
Trlntoc 6.7 7.0 8.3 8.7 9.1 8.6 ,7.6 7.7 8.0 8.6
Te.aco 18.5 21.1 19.7 18.0 • 18.6 18.7 16.3 15.4 11.2 9.7
Pr..ler Con$Ot Idated ~ ~ ---!!..:l ~ ~ ~ ~ --2.:1 --2.:1 ~
Totet Production 216.0 212.2 229.1 229.5 214.4 212.0 189.3 177.0 159.9 169.5
~: Mlnl.try of Energy and Naturel Re.ource ••
I \.H
o
The result was that until 1943, refining
capacity and domestic production were each year of
the same amount with, if anything, a small
overcapacity in the refining sector. Thereafter,
production stagnated, while refinery capacity grew
apace without any pressure or persuasion from the
government. (27)
The geographical and other advantages of
Trinidad and Tobago as a refinery centre with easy
access to either North or South America, or to
Western Europe and Africa were recognized.
In 1957, Texaco Inc. purchased Trinidad Oil
Co. formely Trinidad Leasehold Ltd. and immediately
expanded and later continued to expand and diversify
the capacity of what was the largest refinery in the
British Commonwealth. The results, in terms of the
relationship between domestic production and refinery
though-put, and the dependence upon imported crudes
for sustaining the refinery, are clearly shown in Fig
3. (28) This dependence on foreign imported crude oil
presented problems or at least contained an element
of potential instability and weakness in the
petroleum industry, which had become the main pillar
of the economy. The oil industry was sUbject to an
inordinate and unacceptable dependence upon foreign
production, business policy and decision making. It
31
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therefore became important for the government to
stimulate domestic production; and since land
production of petroleum had ceased to furnish the new
large scale output, it was necessary to turn to the
marine areas. Hence, the incentives given to marine
production in the Gulf of Paria in the form of the
SUbmarine Well Allowance of 1954, and the special
terms provided in the orginal license agreement with
the Pan American oil Co. in 1961 for exploration,
etc. off the east coast of Trinidad. (29)
Most of the country's production of crude oil
is refined at two refineries the Trinidad and
Tobago oil refinery (Trintoc) or Texaco refinery. But
all the crude produced by Amoco (about 60% of total
production) is exported, while the remainder is
refined at either the local Trintoc or Texaco
refineries.
These two local refineries have a rated
capacity of approximately 140,000 barrels per day.
Over the past couple of years, because of the adverse
economics of refining, the level of utilization of
refining capacity has been declining steadily. (and
was approximately 50 - 55% of capacity in 1979). (30)
The two local refineries produced a very wide
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range of petroleum products, most of which are
exported to the U.S.A. The dominant product is fuel
oil, which accounts for appoximately 55% of total
output. (31)
Trinidad and Tobago, although it imports
crude oil for refining and re-exports at present,
cannot be classified as a net importer of petroleum
products for domestic consumption; the country's
entire domestic energy requirements are met from
local production.
Submarine Well Allowance:
When the Solado fields were discovered in
1954, the oil firms approached the government of
Trinidad and Tobago with a request for a depletion
allowance, (somewhat similar to that which is
obtained in the U.S.A.). They argued that the cost
was higher for operation offshore, claiming well cost
would be two to three times that for land operation;
and it was essential to have such an allowance
otherwise no new development was possible. In
response to the need to find new reserve for the
decline in stagant land production, a sUbmarine well
allowance was instituted through Income Tax Ordinance
No. 48 of 1955.
Briefly the act provided, as a deduction from
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gross income, an allowance to the oil firms at the
following rates.
On a per well basis :
10% of the gross value of the production
for each year from 1956 to 1960 inclusive.
- 15% from 1961 to 1965 inclusive.
- 20% from 1966 to 1982 inclusive.
The act stipulated, however, that the
deductions must not exceed 40%· of the chargeable
income for the taxable year (for each well), before
deducting the allowance. (32)
In 1970, the government reduced the submarine
well allowance to 10% on the basis of the following:
1) The submarine well allowance was
calculated on the gross income and, in that sense,
ranked equally with the royalty payment to the
sovereign and owner. In the U.S.A, percentage
depletion is computed as a percentage of the gross
income after deducting royalty payments.
2) While the royalty rate was fixed at 10%,
the submarine well allowance escalated, as stated
above, from 10 to 15 to 20 percent of the gross
income, so that in the final period the operator
received twice as much as the sovereign.
3) The greater benefits were to accrue, when
the oil firms had less need for them and when
36
production was at its peak. The result was that the
field would be approaching eXhaustion before the
government revenue would have begun to be relieved of
the burden of the allowance. (33)
The submarine well allowance was an incentive
to reinvest by the companies for new oil fields - but
instead the companies saw the allowances as funds to
be utilized in increasing the dividend payments to
shareholders, or for investment in more productive
areas in other countries.
In April 1981, new legislation, retroactive
to Janurary 1980, was enacted amending the Petroleum
Act of 1974. The major thrust of the amendment was to
provide tax relief to the oil companies. There were
four major policy objectives in the bill:-
a) To promote futher petroleum industry
development.
b) To enhance government administrative
control over the petroleum industry.
c) To insure that the state receives the
maximum benefit from petroleum production and sale.
d) To establish a taxation policy that would
be harmonious with international tax systems. (34)
Contractual and Fiscal Regime:
37
All production of petroleum in Trinidad and
Tobago is regulated by license. A number of
production sharing contracts have been signed, but
none have resulted in the discovery of oil, and
although gas discoveries were made, they remain shut
in.
on all
of 5% of
levied
the rate
Financial obligations are as follows:
a) Royalty on crude oil is payable at the
rate of 12.5% for Amoco and 10% for other producers.
It is based on the value of products deemed to have
been refined from the crude.
b) Petroleum duty is a per barrel payment
designed to cover the annual expenses of the Ministry
of Energy and Natural Resources. Currently it amounts
to about $.16 U.S. per barrel.
c) Petroleum Production Levy has been charged
on all producers in order to subsidize the retail
price of petroleum products in the country.
d) Petroleum Profits Tax dates back to the
Petroleum Taxes Act of 1974. The current rate is 45%
of taxable income.
e) Unemploymen Levy is
businesses in the country at
taxable income.
f) Depreciation; in general the capital
allowances provided for in the Income Tax Ordinance
Act are fairly conservative, but some special
features have been adopted over the years to
encourage exploration and production. For marine
operations, a submarine production allowance was
introduced.
g) Witholding Tax applies to remittances of
dividends of profits. The statutory rate is 25% but
this is reduced to the 10-25% range if a double
taxation treaty is in effect. The rate for the U.S.A.
is 10%.
h) Supplemental Petroleum Tax (SPT) was
introduced by the Petroleum Tax (Amendment) Act of
1981, which was made retroactive to January 1, 1980.
SPT is levied on gross income from the sale of crude
oil.(35)
By late 1982, as oil prices began to decline
and production cost continued to increase, it became
clear that the SPT taxes were too severe. A
comprehensive review of the system of taxation of
marine producing companies, involving extensive
discussion with these companies, was completed in
1984 on the basis of which the Cabinet agreed to the
following:-
That royalty payments on crude oil be
deducted from gross income prior to the determination
of the Supplemental Petroleum Tax with effect from
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January 1, 1984.
- That the existing schedule of production
allowances based on incremental production be
replaced by a single annual production allowance of
30% of gross income from up to 2 million barrels of
oil production per field.
- That the existing incremental investment
allowance applicable to marine areas, whereby 100% of
the tangible drilling costs is allowed as a deduction
against gross income, prior to the determination of
the supplemental petroleum tax, be eliminated and
replaced by the two allowances designed to facilitate
investment in the plant and to promote intangible
drilling activity; as of Jan 1, 1985.
That the Submarine Well Allowance be
terminated with effect from Jan 1, 1984.
- That the rate of Supplemented Petroleum Tax
for marine operations be reduced from 60% to 55% with
effect from Jan 1, 1984.(36)
This entire package of proposals has as its
prime objective the viability of the local oil
industry. Indeed, while these measures may result in
a marginal decrease in fiscal revenue in the very
short term, they are intended to ensure a steady
stream of revenue and continued significant
contributions from the industry. Already we have seen
an increase in the production of oil of 6.3% in 1984
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over 1983. (37)
In response, the two major producing
companies in the marine areas, Amoco and Trinmar have
submitted for the consideration and approval of the
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources expanded
work programmes for the period 1984-1989 over and
above their normal activities. These programmes,
which involve expenditure of approximately TT$l,OOO
million, are expected to prove up to an additional
100 million barrels of reserves and will also result
in the production of more heavy oil than at
present. (38)
Further, a technical committe, under the
direction of a Ministerial Team, has been reviewing
with the producing companies specific measures which
may be taken in 1985-1989, to ensure the earliest
possible development of some of Trinidad and Tobago's
considerable reserves of heavy oil not exploited to
date. (39)
oil Production prospects:
Reserves:
It is estimated that 4.9 billion barrels of
oil may be recovered ultimately from the sedimentary
basins of Trinidad, this assumes 2.1 billion barrels,
the estimated statistical mean value, remains to be
found as of January 1, 1979. (See table 5).
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Approximately 1.8 billion barrels of oil have been
produced from known fields. These may have nearly 1.1
billion barrels remaining to be produced, including
nearly 0.3 billion barrels of difficult to recover
oil which may be produced at higher cost. Thus, less
than 60% of Trinidad and Tobago possible crude oil
resources has been discovered and over 40% has been
depleted through 1981.(40)
Table 5 showing Ultimately Recoverable Crude oil
Resources of Trinidad. (million barrels).
Sedimentary ultimately Discov. Depleted Undis. Rem.
Basins recover (as of Jan., 1979) recov
41
Southern 2709
East 1826
Northern 392
Total 4927
2209
626
2
2837
1543
248
2
1793
500
1200
390
2090
1166
1578
390
3134
Source: The Petroleum Resources of Venezuela and
Trinidad and Tobago Energy information Administration
U.s. Dept. of Energy. DOE/EIA -0398. July 1983.
Approximately one-half of the remaining
recoverable oil of Trinidad may be produced from the
East Trinidad Atlantic shelf area. In the past,
however, only one-fifth of Trinidad's known oil
resources have been found in the East Coast area. The
Southern and Central basin could contain about
one-third of the remaining southern land areas,
although the area contains more than three-fourths of
the known deposits. The Northern basin has an
insignificant quantity of known deposits1 ultimately,
however, this area could contain as much as one-sixth
of the remaining recoverable oil of Trinidad.
Trinidad and Tobago's currently identified
natural gas reserves are considered adequate to
sustain anticipated increases in demand until at
least the year 2030. Proven reserves of unassociated
gas offshore are estimated at nearly 11 trillion
cubic feet, while total reserves, appropriately
discounted for risk, are on the order of 18 trillion
cubic feet. (41)
Table 6 Unassociated Natural Gas Reserves of Trinidad
(trillion cubic feet)
Proven Reserves Total disc. Res.
East Coast 7.13 13.01
North Coast 3.42 4.96
Total 10.55 17.97
Source:MENR estimates based on Ryder Scott Study
in UNDP World Bank Report, April,1986.
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Productivity per well:
In 1962 the industry had a ratio of
approximately 28.1 barrels per foot drilled. (42) In
1984, the ratio was 32.3 barrels per foot drilled.
This increase in productivity per foot drilled was
due almost entirely to the higher productivity in the
marine fields as compared to land fields. (43) In
1984, there were 3,133 producing wells in Trinidad,
giving a daily production of some 165,948 barrels. Of
this 2,625 were land based wells producing an average
of 39,033 barrels/day. There are 508 marine wells
which average approximately 126,915 barrels/day,
nearly three times the average for the land and
accounting for approximately 78% of total
production. (44) Total land production in 1984 was
13.7 million barrels. Therefore it is not surprising,
that despite the somewhat higher cost of marine
operations, the marine wells app~ar to offer the sure
way to economic well-being.
Decline in Prices and Production:
In the 1970s, there was the need to develop
hydrocarbon production offshore because of the
decline in oil prices during this period. One of the
factors that influenced the decline was the rapid
growth of world production. The prolific growth of
oil production in the Middle East could,
unintentionally perhaps, bring about for those
governments both a decline in unit prices and
compensation in terms of total government revenues by
increasing output. Trinidad and Tobago could do
neither. It ceased to be the largest producer in the
Commonwealth, and its share, 1% of world production,
became less than 0.5%. The twin factors of declining
prices and declining production combined to reduce
government revenues and domestic income and to
undermine the balance of payments position, with the
result that the need for new supplies became
imperative. The 2,000 square miles of land area
having proved incapable of meeting the gap, the much
greater marine area was the logical alternative.
with the recent decline in oil output and
world oil prices, and a reSUlting decline in
government revenue and expenditures, the Trinidad and
Tobago gross domestic product fell by 6.1% (per
annum) between 1983 and 1984, and the country's
fiscal and balance of payments situations both
deteriorated.(45) Exacerbating the situation is the
sharp decline in the country's refinery operations.
Imports of crude oil for processing have been halted
because of negotiations between Tesero and Trinidad
and Tobago oil Company. Capacity utilization fell to
below 30% in 1983 and 1984, and both refineries have
been incurring heavy losses. (46). A series of new
natural gas based export industries have come on
stream during the early 1980's, but their
contribution to total economic output and export
earnings has remained small but could surely boost
the economy.
As international energy prices are not
expected to strengthen significantly over the medium
term, there is little prospect for an immediate
return to past patterns of economic expansion based
on high profits in the energy sector. The key
objective is to minimize further short-term falls in
economic output and secure modest growth in the late
1980's. Projected increases in unit costs and further
declines in real oil prices imply that oil revenues
will continue to fall sUbstantially.
A strategy to minimize the decline in oil
revenues will need to focus on a further fine-tuning
of the oil producer tax structure, and a careful
planning of investment in the pUblic sector holdings
onshore and offshore. To cut refinery operating
losses and minimize reductions in oil export earnings
will require a major restructuring of refinery
operations. (47)
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Further development of natural gas based
industries cannot be expected to yield substantial
new central government revenues, but a well-designed
program for developing new joint-venture projects can
provide a key source of value-added and foreign
exchange by the end of the decade.
Viewing the Trinidad and Tobago economy in
1986, substantial progress has been made in adjusting
to the post-oil boom era, particularly in terms of
reductions in fiscal and balance of payments
deficits, through cut-backs in government spending
and a budgeting of foreign exchange for exports (48).
Nevertheless, the economy remains largely dependent
upon the petroleum sector. Petroleum revenues
accounted for 42% of total central government revenue
in 1986, and government expenditure were equivalent
to 39% of Gross Domestic Product, at market prices.
Exports of crude oil and petroleum products continued
to account for over 80% of total merchandise export
value. (49) Manufacturing, including refining and
petrochemicals accounted for only 9.3% of Gross
Domestic Product (GOP) at current prices. Agriculture
comprised only 3% of GOP. During the oil boom,
construction output was 13% of GOP, it remained
larger than manufacturing and agriculture
combined. (SO) Services accounted for over one half of
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GDP in 1984 in current terms, despite recent sharp
declines. Further significant changes, particularly
in the structure and potential sources of growth,
will need to occur during the next decade (51)
Given the level of maturity in Trinidad and
Tobago's oil development and the likelihood of
further decline in crude oil prices during the
remainder of the 1980's, there is little doubt that
central government revenue from the petroleum sector
will continue to decline. While future oil price
trends are highly uncertain, most industry analysts
foresee a continued fall in world prices, especially
over the short term. There is little prospect for a
recovery to recent price levels by the end of the
decade. Although OPEC on August 2, 1986 called for a
reduction in output of member countries and an
increase in oil prices, there was no agreement then.
(52) In February 1987, when OPEC decided to reduced
oil production, the price of oil has increased from
u.s $13 to $18 a barrel.
Without a major new program for investment in
oil development in Trinidad, oil production would
decline by at least 6% per annum during the remainder
of the decade; compounding the effects of a weak
market price structure on government revenue (53).
However, increased investment in the oil sector,
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spurred by recent revisions in the government
taxation regime, can temporarily arrest the decline
in oil production, and even enable production to
increase slightly over the short term. Such a
scenario could somewhat soften the decline in
government oil revenues, as well as provide direct
balance-of-payments benfits and a series of indirect
economic benefits, but government oil revenues would
still continue to fall, even with the most optimistic
assumption regarding oil prices. Stabilization of
production can only occur with substantial increases
in unit costs and hence reductions in the net income
available to be split between the government and the
oil producers.
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Table 7
Tobago
Showing oil Production of Trinidad
1975 - 1984. (million barrels per day
and
1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
216 229.5 214.4 212.0 189.3 177.0 159.9 169.5
(source: Central Statistical Office, Trinidad and
Tobago, 1984)
In 1984, typical costs per barrel produced
onshore including depreciation, were reportedly about
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Map 5: Areas under oil exploration in Trinidad
and Tobago.
!
I
~
'0
. ' I
. ~l ~ ,~ .
,
,
I
I ' t ' .: . •
"I :
,'.
..
:
\ .
. :
!. 1-
; "1
I
. . . ~ ..------.,,··1···
!.!
• • _• • •••1i "
,
• . • •.• • • _ .1 ~ ••• ~
$l3.50jbbl or almost three times costs offshore, this
is because land deposits had been reduced and
drilling had to be carried out at greater depths,
while the average price obtained for the heavier
onshore crude oil was some 15% lower than the average
offshore price. Barring dramatic reductions in prices
the onshore industry can profitably sustain further
substantial increases in unit costs through increased
investment in higher cost development, but the
industry cannot be expected to provide the net income
and government revenue levels of the past. with the
present oil prices of $18 u.S.jbarrel, there is a
great reduction in the government revenues from the
industry. (54) The economy of the country is in great
difficulty. The Trinidad and Tobago government has a
lot to lose with these reduced OPEC oil prices.
Net income levels per barrel produced
offshore will continue to far exceed onshore levels,
but the effect of the increasing unit costs required
to uphold offshore production levels and weak market
prices will also serve to reduce government revenue
levels.
Even with an increase in total production
onshore and offshore of about 4% in 1985, and average
price levels for the year at approximately May 1985
levels, the government percentage take of the oil
industry's net income fell from about 85% to about
50
80%, while its average take of the market price could
fall from some 65% to perhaps 58%. Corresponding
total government petroleum revenues were TT$2.5
billion, which implied roughly a 20% reduction from
1984 levels in real terms. (54) There is a further
decline in revenue during 1986 -1987; for this period
government percentage take of the market price will
most likely be in the 40 - 45% range. Thus government
oil revenue will be below TT$1 .5 billion or less than
half the 1984 level in real terms. (56)
Government oil revenues clearly can be
expected to fall substantially in the future, but
just how fast they will fall is uncertain. Future oil
prices will play a critical role, but so will future
investment patterns in the oil industry, which will
define the relationship between increasing unit costs
and increasing production above rates of natural
decline. This relationship underlines the importance
of refining the government's taxation and investment
incentive policies towards the sector - a process
which should include greater sophistication in
monitoring and stimulating industry reponses,
consideration of the impact of future price changes,
and to some extent, a balancing of revenue
maximization against other economic benefits from
production. Also the expansion of its claims offshore
in order to increase the possible areas where oil
could be found could be benefical.
Economic Growth:
While the indirect effects on GOP of
developments in the petroleum sector (especially oil
price developments), caused by decline in government
petroleum sector revenues, have major negative
implications for future economic growth, there is a
significant potential for increase in the direct
value-added contribution of the petroleum sector to
GOP. Of key importance is the further development of
the natural gas-based petroleum industry, therefore
there is need to develop the gas fields on the east
coast and north coast of Trinidad and Tobago.
Over the short term, increases in
petrochemical output are limited to potential gains
through improvements in capacity utilization or
decentralization in existing plants, but the
commissioning of a series of new plants by the end of
the decade could make a significant contribution to
economic growth.
The optimal pace of development of new
petrochemical plants will need to be determined by
rigorous economic and financial analysis on a
projet-by-project basis. In a rapid growth scenario,
output of ammonia (including ammonia used for urea
production), could conceivably reach about 2.7
52
million tons by 1990, compared with 1.3 million tons
in1984. If the proposed methanol plant is
commissioned by 1990, methanol output could rise to
over 900,000 tons in 1990 compared to 180,00 tons in
1984. (57)
Assuming value added levels per unit output
on par with recent levels, value added in the
petrochemical industry from these developments would
increase to two and one-half times the 1984 level by
1990. The share of the petrochemical industry in the
Gross Domestic Product would surely rise in 1990.
Summary:
The failure to find new land based reserves
would have had serious consequences on the economy of
Trinidad and Tobago, had it not been for the
discovery of marine fields. Marine production
accounts for an approximate 78% o~ total production
in 1984. The backbone of the economy of Trinidad and
Tobago is based on the local oil industry. In 1984
this industry contributed 40% of the gross domestic
product. It also comprised about 80% of the total
merchandised handled in the export trade. This sector
has been the dominant force in the country's economic
development.
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Chapter 2: Venezuela Oil Industry and the Tourist
Industry in Barbados and Grenada
Venezuela:
The Republic of Venezuela occupies most of the
northwest coastal area of South America; its areal
size is appoximately 352,100 sq.mls (912,100 sq.km).
It is Located mostly between 2°N to l~N latitude and
600 W to 730W longitude. The sedimentary areas which
are actually and potentially petroleum prospective
total 123,600 sq.mls (320,000 sq. km), or 35% of the
total land mass. (1) In addition, Venezuela has 32,000
sq. mls of continental shelf or (83,000 sq.km.),
measured out to the 600 ft depth (approximately 200 m
isobath). (2) See map 8.
There are five sedimentary areas of historic
interest . The most important from a historical crude
oil production viewpoint are: the Maracaibo Basin,
Maturin Basin, Barinas Basin, Guarico Basin and the
Falcon Basin.
In addition, the offshore areas include from west
to east: the Gulf of Venezue1a Basin, the Gulf of
Paraguana basin, the La Vela Embayment, the Isla
Margarita-Tobago Trough, the Gulf of Paria and the
Orinoco Delta Shelf. (See Map 8)
Structural Geology
The sedimentary and tetonic history of Venezuela
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4. The Petroleum Geology
of Venezuela and TrInidad
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Figure 4. location Map of ltle
EasternVenezuela Tertiary Basin
(len., aad oCheTl, 1958)
and Trinidad was influenced by the Proterozoic age
(precambrian) granite and metamorphics which composes
the Guyana Shield. The Shield comprises about
one-half of the land mass of Venezuela, which is
approx. 335,000 sq. mls. The Trinidad land mass is
about 2,200 sq. mls. (3)
It is believed that the Guyana Shield with few
exceptions has been a stable feature through
geological time. Between the Craton-Shield and the
geosynclines is a belt of pericratonic basins, which
are pre-Cambrian metamorphic rocks. (4)
The geosynclinal trough which extended east-west
along the northern edge of Venezuela and across
Trinidad existed since middle Precambrian time. The
true width of the geosynclinal belt is not known. It
is believed that early Paleozoic sediments were
deposited in the geosyncline and were subsequently
uplifted into mountains during late Paleozoic-Early
Mesozoic time. (5)
Faulting and vulcanism which accompanied the
uplifting raised the whole of the area above
sea-level. The erosional period which followed the
uplift resulted in positive structural features which
had an important impact on late Mesozoic (Cretaceous)
and Tertiary sedimentation. (6) See fig 4.
This was followed by the Laramide Orogeny (late
Cretaceous-Eocene time) which raised the mountains of
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the Andes and the coastal ranges of Venezuela and
Trinidad. The Tertiary phase of the Orogeny
interrupted the sedimentation process along the
southern margin of the Caribbean in the late Eocene
time. A series of epeirogenic movements marked the
beginning of subsidence of the Maracaibo-Falcon and
East Venezuela and Trinidad basins. (7)
Depositional History
The sedimentary history of Venezuela and Trinidad
is very complex, and the brief discussion included
herein provides only a general overview of the
depositional history. The sedimentary sequence
discussion is limited to the prinicipal sedimentary
basins, beginning first with the Maracaibo basin and
then proceeding east to Trinidad.
Maracaibo Basin
The Maracaibo basin is approximately 27 thousand
sq. mls. in western Venezuela. It is the most
important producing province in the country. In the
Maracaibo basin, sandstones are found in the extreme
southern part of the basin with limestone in the
northern portion.
Most oil accumulations in the Maracaibo basin are
found in anticlinal structures. Faulting has occured
in most of the structures; this enhanced the
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accumulation of oil particularly in the Cretaceous
reservoirs.
The dominance of this basin as a source of
Venezuelan oil is made apparent by the fact that it
has yielded 70% of the total cumulative oil
production. During the first half of 1979, it
contributed nearly 80% of Venezuelan oil production.
Most of the oil produced from this basin is from
sandstone reservoirs. (8)
The Falcon Basin
This is located east of the Maracibo Basin,
covering an area of about 14 thousand sq. mls. The
basin was formed by compression folds and faults. The
oil deposit in this basin is not as good as the
Maracibo Basin. The largest field in this area is an
elongated asymmetrical dome cut by numerous
transverse faults. (9)
Eastern Venezuela Basin (including Trinidad)
The Eastern Venezuela Tertiary basin is an
east-trending and east-plunging structural and
sedimentary trough located in the north central and
north eastern part of Venezuela and the island of
Trinidad. The Basin covers an area of 59.4 thousand
sq.mls, of which about one-third is not prospective
for oil because of inadequate sediment cover; another
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5 thousand sq. mls. is covered by the Orinoco
petroleum belt area. Thus about 35.1 thousand sq.
mls. is oil prospective with an effective sedimentary
volume of 67.2 thousand cubic mls.(lO) See Fig 4.
The Eastern Venezuela and Trinidad region was
subjected to flooding of the sea during the Paleozoic
and Early Mesozoic time, which was followed by
faulting movements associated with igneous activity.
The sediments of the shallow seas are the most
probable petroleum source rocks. The numerous
occurences of such environments are the reason for
the large number of oil sands. In addition, great
rivers emptied into the basin carrying abundant
organic material. See Map 3.
Venezuela Petroleum History
During the Pre-Columbian era the presence of
"menes" - an indigenous name for surface seepages of
petroleum - revealed the existence of oil in what is
now Venezuela. In 1539, just a few decades after the
discovery of Venezuela, a barrel of oil was shipped
to spain for medicinal purposes. In 1914, the first
commercial volumes of oil were discovered on the
eastern shores of lake Maracaibo; a field which at
present remains very productive. (11)
In 1925, the value of petroleum exports outstripped
that of agricultural exports for the first time, a
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situation that has been maintained ever since.
Originally, the oil found was nearly all of Tertiary
age, in Miocene and Eocene reservoirs; but with the
discovery of a cretaceous limestone reservoir at La
Paz in 1944; a new and continuing phase of deeper
exploration commenced. (12)
For many years about 600 wells were drilled every
year in Venezuela, many of them in the shallow waters
of Lake Maracaibo, which was one of the first
offshore areas of the world to be developed. However,
in the early 1960's the intensity of exploration
drilling declined, due to unfavorable political and
fiscal conditions. As a consequence of this
curtailment of exploration activity, Venezuelan oil
production has been declining slowly in recent times.
Thus in 1976, production was 2,294 million barrels of
which 82% came from Western Venezuela, and 18% from
eastern Venezuela. In 1984, output was notably
smaller, amounting to 1,799 million barrels, as
compared to Trinidad's 62,042 thousand barrels in
Table 8 Venezuela - oil Production (million Barrel)
Year Production (mm. brl.)
1976 2,294
1977 2,238
1978 2,166
1979 1,356
63
1980 2,168
1981 2,107
1982 1,893
1983 1,796
1984 1,799
Source: Venezuela Embassy, Office of Petroleum
Affairs, Washington, D.C. 1986.
Costs of production are high in Venezuela, since
the average production per well is only about 300
barrels/day from some 12,700 wells, 80% of which are
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on artificial lift. (14) The reluctance of the
Venezuelan government to grant new concessions over a
period of more than a decade, coupled with the high
sUlphur contents of Venezuelan crudes, which render
them less acceptable in pollution conscious areas,
are other factors which have restrained development.
Venezuela was for many years second only to the
U.S. as a world oil producer. The Soviet Union then
took that position, and both Iran and Saudi Arabia
have since outstripped Venezuelan output. Until
recently, however, Venezuela was still the world's
largest oil exporter, about 1,370 million barrels per
year, mainly to U.S. East Coast and to Canada.
However because of the U.S. quota system, Venezuela's
share of U.S. oil imports has been steadily dropping
in recent years from the peak of 52% reached in 1959.
(15)
Table 9 Venezuela Oil Exports (million barrels).
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
1,370 1,320 1,244 1,402 1,283 1,267 1,062 985 1,007
(source: Venezuela Embassy, Office of Petroleum
Affairs, 1986).
Petroleum exports contribute appoximately
three-quarters of Venezuela's foreign exchange
earnings, thus emphasizing the need for Venezuela to
maintain reasonable levels of exploration,
development and production. About one-eighth of its
annual production is consumed by the domestic market
but consumption is increasing rapidly. (16)
Nearly one-third of Venezuela's crude oil exports
flow through the refineries of the Netherlands
Antilles, and sUbsequently, the petroleum products
are re-exported. About one-third of the crude oil is
imported by the u.s. and Canada. The remainder of the
crude oil exports enter markets throughout the world,
principally in South America and Western Europe.
At present, payments from the oil industry
constitute over 70% of the National Treasury's
revenues. (17)
Reserves:
It is estimated that 89.6 billion barrels of oil
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will be recovered ultimately from the sedimentary
basins of the Republic of Venezuela. This assumes
that 23 billion barrels, (the statistical mean value
of a range with a probability of appoximately 40%),
remain to be found in fields undiscovered as of
January 1, 1979. As of January 1, 1984, 41.1 billion
barrels of oil have been produced from the known
fields. (18)
Table 10 Ultimately Recoverable Crude Oil Resources
of Venezuela (billion Barrels).
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Sedimentary
Basin
Ultimately Discovered Depleted Undis. Rem.
recoverable (as of Jan 1, 1979) reco.
oil oil
Maracaibo
Falcon
Maturin
Margarita
Total
54.85
5.09
28.13
1.49
89.56
47.5
0.09
19.13
0.00
66.67
25.8
0.05
8.57
0.00
34.41
7.40
5.00
9.00
1.49
22.89
29.1
5.04
19.56
1.49
55.15
source: The Petroleum Resources of Venezuela and Trinidad
and Tobago Energy Information, U.s. Department of Energy
DOE/EIA-0398 , JulY,1985.
In the known fields there is also an estimated 16.1
billion barrels of proven reserves recoverable under
current conditions, and an additional 13.8 billion
barrels of oil which will require secondary recovery
efforts if the oil is to be produced. (19)
About 45% of Venezuela resources have been
produced; and about three-fourths of Venezuela's
estimated crude oil resources have been found as of
1984. It took 67 years to produce 41.1 billion
barrels of oil, left is 48.5 billion barrels. (20)
Exploration:
Petroles de Venezuela's exploration activities have
the following goals: discovery of new reservoirs,
especially of light and medium crudes; evaluation of
all promising areas in the country and assessment of
the volume of oil and non-associated gas still to be
discovered; precise quantification and delination of
the deposits containing the heavy oil in the Orinoco
oil belt. In view of its size and geological
complexity, precise calculation of the amount of oil
present in this vast basin is difficult. But it is
estimated that it may exceed one billion barrels. (21)
Efforts to find new reservoirs of medium and light
crudes are concentrated on cretaceous limestone
formations in East and West of the Country, as well
as on the continental shelf.
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As of January 1987 Venezuela's crude oil reserves
jumped to 55.5 billion barrels at year end 1986, from
29.5 billion barrels at year end 1985, officials
said. The increase partly reflects the inclusion for
the first time 18 billion barrels of easily
recoverable reserves in the Orinoco oil Belt. (22)
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1. The Gulf of Venezuela
2. Gulf of La Vela and Triste Gulf
3. The Bonaire Basin.
4. The Central-Eastern Continental Shelf.
5. The Margarita-Tobago Shelf.
6. The Venezuelan section of Gulf of Paria.
7. The Orinoco Delta.
B. Southern Portion, Lake Maracaibo.
9. Delta Amacuro Area.
10. The Orinoco Petroleum Belt.
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Barbados:
l)Economic Background
Barbados, the most easterly of the Caribbean
islands, is one of the most densely populated
countries in the world. Its total area of 166 sq.
mls., and population of 253,000 gives it a density of
1,524 per sq. mls. Population growth has
traditionally been low and is currently below 1%.
Barbados has become, over the last two decades or so,
one of the more developed countries in the
Commonwealth Caribbean. Within the Commonwealth
Caribbean, its per capita income in 1979 was $1,400
(U.S); this was surpassed only by oil rich Trinidad
and Tobago and the Bahamas. (23)
Barbados' natural resources are limited. soil,
topography and rainfall have contributed to the
traditional emphasis placed on sugar cane within the
agricultural sector. No metallic mineral deposits are
known, but pockets of petroleum and natural gas now
supply a modest fraction of consumption. In the last
couple of decades, the country's most valuable
natural resources have been its beautiful beaches and
mild weather, which presently attract almost 400,000
tourists annually. (24)
Major Economic Developments
The mid-1950's marked an important milestone in
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Barbados economic development. After three centuries
of exclusive dependence on sugar, the economy began
at that time a process of economic diversation and
structural change. This process has been mainly
characterized by: a) the emergence of manufacturing
... initially inward looking, but increasingly export
oriented; and b) tourism as an important economic
sector.
Table 11 Composition of Barbados Gross Domestic
Product (percent)
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Agriculture
(sugar)
Manufacturing
Tourism
Other (services,
publ ic sector)
1970
14.2
(10.4)
7.9
8.6
69.3
1975
10.0
(6.4)
10.0
11. 6
68.4
1979
9.4
(3.5)
10.8
15.4
64.4
source: World Bank - Economic Memomrandum on Barbados
June 10, 1981.
Economic Development During 1980:
Barbados experienced during 1980, its fifth
consecutive year of rapid economic expansion. The
performance of the balance of payments improved.
Public finances, however, weakened somewhat and the
rate of inflation increased moderately.
Because of good rainfall sugar production increased
sUbstantially. It reached 135,000 tons in 1981. (25)
Manufacturing exhibited a strong performance. The
construction sector also appears to have expanded in
spite of shortage of skilled labour. Tourist arrivals
increased, also there is a larger proportion of
winter arrivals, which average higher expenditure per
vistor, thus value added in the sector increased
slightly. Annual rate of growth of GDP at 1984 market
prices was 9.1%. (26)
2) Development Objectives, Issues and Policies:
Background
Barbados has experienced, in the last few years,
rapid economic growth. As a result, per capita income
is relatively high and employment has sUbstantially
increased. This rapid growth has been achieved with
financial stability. Public finances have been well
managed. External debt ratios are low and
international reserves are not too high. In addition,
over the last two decades or so, Barbados has
developed a good economic infrastructure. Also,
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education and health facilities are relatively good,
and the distribution of income is relatively
equitable.
Barbados' resource base is narrow, and is still
highly dependent on sugar and tourism for most of its
foreign exchange earnings. Domestic production of
petroleum covers only about 20% of fuel
consumption. (27)
Development Objectives and strategy
The government's development objectives for the
coming years, as outlined in the 1985-1990
Development Plan and in other governmental statements
are, therefore, to:
a) sustain rapid economic growth and reduce
unemployment, mainly by promoting a sustained
expansion of tourism and manufacturing and increased
sugar production.
b) Achieve a higher degree of economic and export
diversification by promoting manufacturing and
non-sugar agricultural exports.
c) Achieve a higher degree of self-sufficiency by
promoting energy conservation, the development of
traditional and non-traditional sources of energy,
increased non-sugar agricUltural production, and the
use of mineral resource. (28)
Overall, the government's development objectives
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are sound and realistic. They
Barbados' resource potential,
economic experience.
are consistent with
and also with past
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Tourism:
Tourist's arrivals increased significantly during
1977-79, and at present are still increasing. At the
same time, occupancy rates improved, the average
length of stay increased and the geographical
distribution of visitors is now more diversified.
Vistors from the united Kingdom, united states of
America and Caribbean countries have continued to
increase. Flight availability, which has created
problems in some markets, has improved, there is an
increase in charters and less expensive flights from
the u.s. In 1983 the tourist industry showed a 5.2%
increase. In 1984 the total number of visitors were
362,470 and the average tourist dollars spent was
$98/day U.S.(29)
The Barbadian government also intends to increase
further the contribution of tourism to the economy by
increasing value added per visitor. To achieve this,
the government plans to encourage the construction of
large hotels, which create more employment per
bed-night, and the upgrading of present facilities.
Furthermore, promotional efforts are focussing on the
middle and upper segments of the market which
contribute more to value added.
Manufacturing:
Manufacturing production and particulaly
manufactured exports have increased rapidly in the
last few years. The government's industrial
incentives are generally well conceived and
administered, its promotional efforts have been
successful and its provision of factory space has
proved to be a key factor in attracting industrial
ventures, labour relations are good, and the
investment climate is excellent. The sector is
dominated by foreign-owned enterprises, but recently
Barbadians seem more interested in investing in
industrial ventures.
Agriculture:
Sugar production peaked in 1977 at 120,000 tons.
The government policy is to raise sugar production to
150,000 tons. The benefits, however, would be good.
For example at average estimated 1981-85 prices, a
production of 150,000 tons as compared with one of
107,000 would yield u.S. $220 M in additional foreign
exchange per year. (30)
The government has also given priority to increased
production of vegetables, root crops and grain. Root
crops offer some possibility for exports.
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Petroleum:
Proven reserves of hydrocarbons are relatively
small. That of crude oil is estimated at 4 million
barrels, of which about a third may be recoverable;
natural gas is estimated at 10,000 million cubic
feet. (31)
Domestic production of crude oil amounts to some
320,000 barrels. Domestic production of crude oil
started in 1973. In 1980, petroleum imports amounted
to 75% apparent petroleum consumption. Imports of
crude oil from Venezuela amount to some 730,000
barrels per year, and from Trinidad to about 230,000
barrels. Petroleum imports reached U.S.$31.3M in 1980
or 6.2% of domestic exports and 3.9% of the estimated
GOP. (32)
Under governmental licensing, a subsidiary of Mobil
Corporation is carrying out deep (below 6,500 ft.)
oil drilling activities in the Woodburne area, which
is aimed at finding large - by Barbados standards -
reserves of oil. This company is also undertaking an
island-wide seismic survey. No information is
available yet on the results of these exploration and
seismic activities.
Grenada
Grenada lies North west of Trinidad and Tobago, and
has an area of 120 sq. mls.(344 sq.km.) with a
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population of 113,000 as of 1984.
Growth in output in Grenada has been led by the
dominant export agriculture sector and the vital
tourism sector. Bouyancy of these sectors produced
steady growth in GOP of about 4% annually during the
1960's.(33) Since then, growth has fluctuated with
exogenous factors affecting the performance of these
sectors.
In the early 1970's, successive years of
unfavorable weather and political disturbances
adversely affected agricultural output and tourism
and the pace of economic activity slackened markedly.
Economic recovery resumed in 1975 and gained
momentum in 1976, when the GOP rose by 9% as the
economy was recouping earlier losses. All sectors of
the economy contributed to the recovery, but the
major thrust came from expansion in agricultural
output, tourism and pUblic administration. (34) As
growth in agricultural output leveled off, the GOP
growth rate moderated to 5.5% annually in 1977-78.
Prolonged heavy rains late in 1979 adversely affected
agriculture and the political upheaval curtailed
growth in tourist arrivals. As a result, GOP growth
slowed further to an estimated 2% in 1979.(35)
In 1983 with the u.S. invasion of that island the
GOP fell considerably. Now with u.S. aid, agriculture
is reviving, tourists once again are vacationing in
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Grenada, so the GOP is rising again. (no figures are
available yet). Initial estimates show the Grenadian
economy growing by about 3% in 1985 and averaging 4%
per annum thereafter. (36)
Agriculture:
Agriculture is the dominant sector responsible for
roughly one-third of GOP and employing 30% of the
labor force. The authorities estimated that land
under cUltivation is some 50% below what it was
fifteen years ago. (37) Moreover, this sector has
suffered from serious neglect and urgent efforts are
needed to realize its full potential. The present
government is focusing on the issue of land use and
land tenure, credit and extension. The government
hopes to bring marginal lands into production of food
crops and liverstock,contributing to better soil and
water conservation.
Agriculture's performance, therefore, is crucial to
the health of the economy. However, markets for the
traditional exports have been weakening for a long
time past and the structural problems of
fragmentation of holdings, labor supply and primitive
technology all result in low productivity and farm
incomes. To modernize this sector, public policy is
addressing the issues of agricultural organization
infrastructure, markets and human resource
development. In 1984, it was estimated that the
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agricultural sector's contribution to GDP was about
25%. About 75% of the agricultural sectors value
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comes from bananas, cocoa and nutmeg. While
production of these crops have been decreasing, the
presen~ government is making agriculture
revitalization a keystone of their economic growth
policy. (38)
Tourism:
It is estimated that tourism accounts for about
half of Grenada's foreign exchange earnings and, in
addition, has heavy impacts on employment, tax
revenues and retail trade. The continued
deterioration in the performance of this sector in
1982 was thus a significant drag on the economy. (see
Table 12).
Table 12 Grenada selected Tourism indicators
Growth rares
1980 1981 1982·
1980 1981 1982·
Stopover visitors• 29.4 2~.1 23.3 -8.8 ·148 ·7 .2
CC\li~ ship visitor• 144 78 62 ~ .O ·46.7 ·19.9
Av~rage length of stay of
. . (
18 18stopover vuiror
Number of cruise ship calls 236 131 103 18.0 ·44 .~ -21.4
Number of yache calls 1 863 1 367 1 602 8 .~ ·26.1 16.4
Horel and gu~se house beds 1 ~OO 1 ~OO 1 112 -2~ .9
Esr irnared visieor expenditure~ ~4 .3 46.7 46 .6 1.4 ·14 .1 -02
Soul"Ce: Gren..da , Miniury of Tuu(lsm. ./
• Prdiminlry figures .
"T'houunds.
'DIY•.
'Miiliuns of East Catlbbc:an dollan.
Source: United Nation Economic Survey of Latin
America and the Caribbean, Vol.11, 1982.
The serious decline in visitors and in cruise ships
and yachts calls seems not to have been reflected in
visitor expenditure, which just about maintained its
nominal value of 1981. It is in this light that
public policies will have to revive the industry
through provision of facilities for wide-bodied
aircraft, providing more hotels and also more
effective promotion of Grenada as a tourist
destination.
In 1982-83 the government then in power embarked on
the construction of Point Saline a jet airport
largely with fiancing from Cuba. This was thought of
as a solution to the air access problem. But in 1983
because of political upheaval and fear of the Soviets
in the island, u.S. military invaded the island. Work
at the airport was completed by u.S. funds.
Tourist infrastructure is being improved on the
island at present. Now in 1987 with the threat of
terrorism to u.S. citizens abated, holiday makers are
heading for the Caribbean, thus it is expected that
Grenada's tourist trade may boom in the future.
In 1984 the total number of visitors arriving in
Grenada was 39,563 (stayover) and the average tourist
dollar spent was $110 U.S. This is a 19% increase
from the previous year. (39)
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Chapter 3: The Continental Shelf and the 1942 Gulf of
Paria Treaty
The Continental Shelf:
The continental shelf is of fundamental importance
to the future prosperity of Trinidad and Tobago.
Since land production of petroleum began declining in
the late 1960's, it has been proved that the greatest
potential reserves of hydro-carbon resources do exist
in the continental shelf.
Most of the future expansion in oil exploration and
production activity is expected to take place on the
continental shelf. In the face of this reality; the
subjects of the continental shelf and the development
of national legislation in this area are of greatest
importance for the future outcome of oil exploration.
Submarine exploration of petroleum resources falls
under the subdivision of international law known as
the "Law of the Sea". The 1982 united Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea has reaffirmed much
of the 1958 Convention's provisions. It has refined
further certain aspects of marine law, expanded
others, and more importantly it has introduced
fundamental changes of a jurisdictional nature.
As a geological formation, the continental shelf
may be generally described as the submarine
continuation of the land mass, extending under the
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sea to where the sea floor begins to falloff steeply
into oceanic depths ie. a submarine area lying
between the coast and the first substantial fall-off
on the seaward side. (1) But this underwater platform
on Which the continents seem to be sitting is highly
irregular. Conventionally, the seaward edge of the
continental shelf and the beginning of the steep
continental slope are taken to start at a water depth
of 200 metres, but instances are known where the
increase of slope begins at more than 400 metres or
less than 65. Sometimes there is no identifiable
slope at all; instead, what would ordinarily be the
edge of the shelf is a sea floor torn into
intersecting ridges, basins and elongated troughs. (2)
Article 76 para.3 of the 1982 Convention states
that the continental margin comprises the SUbmerged
prolongation of the land mass of the coastal state,
and consist of the sea-bed and subsoil of the shelf,
slope and rise.
This same article, para.5, states that the outer
limits of the continental shelf on the sea-bed shall
not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baseline from
which the breath of the territorial sea is measured;
or shall not exceed 100 nautical miles from the 2,500
metre isobath. (3)
The continental shelf is of extreme international
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economic importance since it is a rich storehouse of
minerals and fuel resources. oil and natural gas are
being mined in increasingly large quantities from the
shelf. About one-third of the world's petroleum
production is derived from submarine areas.
Since it is now a principle of customary
international law that coastal states have exclusive
rights of exploitation over their seaward extension
of the shelf, these states usually enact mining laws
to regulate the exploration and exploitation of all
hyrocarbon resources within their sovereign
jurisdiction. (4)
Trinidad and Tobago enacted the Continental Shelf
Act 1969, to give effect to certain provisions of the
Geneva Convention of 1958.(5) This Act was amended in
1986 in order to include in the municipal law of
Trinidad and Tobago the provisions of Article 76 of
the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. (6)
Trinidad and Tobago is shelf locked as her
continental shelf merges into that of Venezuela.
Eastward Trinidad and Tobago's continental shelf may
extend to appoximately 200 mIs, where it merges into
that of neighbouring Venezuela and Guyana.
Northwards, the shelf stretches into that of
Barbados, Grenada and the Windward Islands.
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Historical Background to the 1942 Treaty:
In the early 1930's geological surveys by a British
committee showed that there were rich oil-bearing
deposits in the seabed and sub-soil of the Gulf of
Paria.(7) Studies revealed that in time these
deposits would be commercially exploitable. (8)
Negotiations began on August 29, 1936. It was
agreed that the two countries would conclude an
agreement after which each government would take
"parallel action to divide up as national territory
(emphasis added) between them, the seabed of the Gulf
of Paria.
At that time delimitation of the seabed outside the
territorial sea was without precedent. Both countries
felt at first that they should agree to a line of
delimitation after Which each government would annex
the area allocated to it. However it was decided that
a treaty followed by Annexation Orders would be a
stronger and more valid declaration in respect to
third states. (9)
The Gulf of Paria Treaty:
On the February 26,1942, the British Government and
the Venezuelan Government signed the Gulf of Paria
Treaty. In this treaty the boundary of the
continental shelf outside the territorial waters in
the gUlf region was delimited between the two
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countries for the exploitation of mineral
resources. (10)
The submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria, eastward
and northward of the dividing lines AB, BY, YX
described in the treaty were annexed to His Majesty's
dominions and attached to Trinidad and Tobago for
administrative purposes. (11) See Map 10.
The treaty is the first international agreement
reached between opposite states concerning the
division of submarine areas, outside territorial
waters.
At that time Trinidad and Tobago was a colony of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and both the united Kingdom and Venezuela
adhered to the then traditional territorial sea limit
of three miles. Therefore, a considerable part of the
waters of the gUlf were high seas.
On gaining independence in 1962, the Government of
Trinidad and Tobago concluded an agreement with the
U.K. generally known as the Devolution Agreement on
August 31, 1962, relating to the inheritance of
international rights and obligations. (12) Trinidad
and Tobago accepted all the treaty obligations
contracted by the U.K.on her behalf during colonial
rule.
The Terms of the Treaty
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The United Kingdom and Venezuela reached agreement
on a treaty delimiting the submarine areas of the
Gulf of Faria that lie beyond the three nautical mile
territorial sea limit of each state. The areas lying
east of that boundary line formed part of the United
Kingdom's dominion and were attached to the colony of
Trinidad and Tobago for administrative purpose. The
areas west of that line were attached to Venezuela
this is stated in Article 1 of the Treaty. (13)
Article 2 provides that each country, "will not
assert any claim to sovereignty or control," over the
submarine areas in the Gulf of Faria, and recognition
would be given to any rights of sovereignty or
control which have been or may hereafter be lawfully
acquired by the other. (14) This claim of sovereignty
resulted in both states annexing the submarine areas.
The British Government by order in council. (The
submarine areas of the Gulf of Faria Annexation
Order, 1942) annexed her submarine areas and attached
them to Trinidad and Tobago for administrative
purposes.
Article 3 gives the geographical location of the
dividing lines AB, BY, and YX which separated the
areas. (See Map 10)
Article 4 makes provision for the appointment of a
mixed commission to demarcate the above lines.
Article 5 and 6 make certain that the status of
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islands and rocks above the surface and the waters of
the gulf or any rights of passage or navigation are
not affected: and measures are to be taken to ensure
navigational safety.
Articles 7 and 8 are rather modern concepts for
that time in that they provide a legal obligation to
prevent pollution of each other's territorial waters
during exploitation of their submarine areas.
Inclusion of these articles indicates that it was the
intention of the parties, (more the British) to
commence exploration for petroleum in their submarine
areas of the Gulf as soon as possible.
According to Article 8 the effective observance of
Articles 6 and 7 must be stipulated in any concession
for exploitation of the submarine areas in the
Gulf.Article 9 states that disputes relating to the
"interpretation or execution of this treaty shall be
settled by peaceful means as are recognised in
International Law." Thus Internatonal Law is given
due recognition.
Was It An Equal Treaty?
The Gulf of Paria Treaty of 1942 divided the
submarine areas of the Gulf giving Venezuela
sovereignty over two-thirds of the area and the U.K.
(now Trinidad and Tobago) one-third of the Gulf.
According to one writer, the background of this
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disproportionate delimation may be found in the fact
that traditionally Venezuela has always opposed the
equidistance priniciple for delimiting the marine
areas of opposite and adjacent states with the claim
that this principle is not a rule of customary
international law.(15) The criterion which Venezuela
urges should be used is the natural prolongation of
the territory and the coastal state. It would appear
historically, the U.K. did accept that rationale when
she agreed to the terms of the 1942 Treaty. (16)
To another writer, the treaty delimited the
submarine areas, seabed and subsoil of the Gulf
proportionately, giving Venezuela appoximately
two-thirds of the area. (17) It can be presumed that
the treaty was an unequal one proportionately.
At that time Great Britain was an imperial power
whereas Venezuela was an emerging Latin Americian
Republic. At that time when this treaty was
concluded, Britain was engaged in the Second World
War. The price and value of oil had increased and it
was needed for the British war effort. Therefore,
Britain could not afford to antagonize Venezuela from
whom she derived 40% of her total oil imports. Thus
during the period of negotiations, 1936-1942, both
countries were on almost equal footing. Therefore
the treaty was not unequal at that time.
88
But Is This Treaty Equal For Trinidad and Tobago
since This Country Has Gained Independence?
Trinidad and Tobago became an independent,
sovereign state on 31st August, 1962. This new status
brought with it renewed evaluation of the legal
implications of treaties which were concluded by the
U.K. and other countries, and which by their terms of
agreement were binding on Trinidad and Tobago.
The law of state succession to treaties is not
straightforward and simple. (18) There is no
established principle stating whether, and if so to
what extent, newly independent states, which were
formerly colonial territories, are bound by or are
entitled to succeed to treaties made on their behalf
by their "parent states."(19)
Trinidad and Tobago, like most of the new
Commonwealth states which emerged after World War II,
concluded a devolution agreement ( i.e. an agreement
transferring property, or rights to a successor),
between itself and the U.K. (20 ) This agreement came
into being by exchange of letters on 31st August,
1962 at Port of Spain between the Prime Minister of
Trinidad and Tobago, Hon. Dr. Eric Williams and the
British High Commissioner. (21)
The view is sometimes expressed that as far as
third parties are concerned devolution agreements
serve no useful purpose and that rules of customary
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international law should govern issues involving
third parties. (22)
The Nyerere Doctrine (so called, after the Prime
Minister of Tanzania in his declaration on Nov. 30,
1961) focuses attention on the right to revise
treaties which devolve on a new state two years after
it has gained its independence and after to enter
into new treaties with the third party states. (23)
In effect what the Nyerere Doctrine seeks to do is to
limit the operation of any treaty which has been
entered into between the U.K. and another party and
which devolves on the new state (this doctrine can
operate both ways with either party being able to
modify, affirm or reject a treaty).
The Nyerere Doctrine can be justified on the ground
that a treaty entered into by the U.K. and another
country which affected a former colonial territory
was res inter alios acta, (24) and that it will be
highly inconvenient, and probably in certain cases
manifestly unjust for the former colonial territory,
after its independence, to be bound by acts which
were imposed upon it ab-extra. (25) Hence the reason
for the limitation of its operative period with the
right to revision. This doctrine is a clever device
to bring about a premature end to a treaty which may
operate to the disadvantage of the new state. (26)
Trinidad and Tobago did not adopt the Nyerere
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Doctrine in any form, but was content to abide solely
by the devolution agreement. So far as Trinidad and
Tobago and Venezuela are concerned, neither party
took any steps to question the validity of treaties
which were entered into between the U.K and Venezuela
and related to Trinidad and Tobago. The fact that it
is almost twenty-five years since Trinidad and
Tobago's independence and the quiescent attitude of
the states is an implicit recognition that they
regard such treaties as valid. Thus if the treaty was
regarded as unequal to Trinidad and Tobago, this
state would have objected to the treaty.
History of the continental Shelf:
Interest in the continental shelf is a
comparatively new development dating from the early
1940's. The Gulf of Paria treaty, although it did not
mention the word continental Shelf, appears to be the
genesis of the new concept. In 1944, Argentina, by
decree No. 1386, reserved to itself the mineral
resources of the "Argentinian Epicontinental Sea,"
which undoubtedly included the shelf and subsoil.
(27)
attracted to the
1945, when the
that the natural
seabed of the
International attention was
concept of the continental shelf in
U.S. President Truman proclaimed
resources of the subsoil and the
but
to
continental shelf beneath the high seas
contiguous to the coasts of the U.S., are subject
its jurisdiction and control. (28)
The proclamation goes on to enunciate that where
the shelf is shared with another state the boundary
shall be determined II in accordance with equitable
principles,1I but the proclamation did not define the
continental shelf. It is clear that the U.S. did not
declare its continental shelf to be national
territory nor did it claim sovereignty over the
sea-bed and sub-soil of its shelf. The U.S. declared
that it would exercise "jurisdiction and control over
the natural resources of its continental shelf. 1I (29)
However, in the Gulf of Paria treaty of 1942, the
U.K. and Venezuela declared that each would not
assert any claim to sovereignty or control over the
other's submarine areas in the Gulf. (30) In this
treaty each party recognized a c~aim to soverignty by
the other.
The U.S. action was almost immediately followed by
unilateral declarations by other states, especially
those of South America, claiming adjacent submarine
areas but asserting varying degrees of sovereignty
over the shelf and superadjacent waters.
The Truman Proclamation was the real impetus to the
development of the doctrine of the continental shelf.
The ICJ in its jUdgment in the North Sea Continental
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Shelf Cases 1969, stated that the Truman
Proclamation:
"has in the opinion of the Court a special status.
Previously, various theories as to the nature and
extent of the rights relative to or exercisable over
the continental shelf had been advanced by the
jurists, pUblicists and technicians. The Truman
Proclamation however, soon came to be regarded as the
starting point of the positive law on the sUbject,
and the chief doctrine it enunciated, namely that of
the coastal state as having an original, natural and
exclusive (in short a vested) right to the
continental shelf off its shore, came to prevail over
all others, being reflected in Article 2 of the 1958
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf." (31)
Article 2 gives states sovereign rights over the
continental shelf for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting its natural resources.
Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
continental Shelf reads:
"For the purpose of these articles, the term
'continental shelf' is used as referring;
a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the
territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural
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resources of the said areas;
b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine
areas adjacent to the coasts of islands. (32)
Article 1 of this Convention incorporates the
definition of the continental shelf in the Truman
Proclamation but goes on to include an exploitability
standard.
Article 76 of the 1982 Convention on the Law Of The
Sea amends the definition to read:
"The continental shelf of a coastal state comprises
the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its territorial sea throughtout the
natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline from
which the breath of the territorial sea is measured
where the outer edge of the continental margin does
not extend up to that distance." (33)
At the time of writing this thesis only 31 states
have so far ratified the 1982 Convention; 60 states
are needed to ratify it, in which case after one year
this Convention would enter into force. Since the
1982 Convention is not yet in force, and has not been
signed by Venezuela; therefore the provisions of
Article 1 on the continental shelf definition of the
1958 convention are still applicable.
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Article 1 of the Gulf of Paria treaty state:
"Submarine areas of the Gulf of Paria, denotes the
sea-bed and sub-soil outside the territorial waters
of the high contracting parties .... "
The "submarine areas" of the Gulf of Paria treaty
are within the definition of the "continental shelf"
in Article 1 of the 1958 Convention.
Article 2.1 of the 1958 Continental Shelf reads:
"The Coastal state exercises over the continental
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
it and exploiting its natural resources."
Article 2.2 goes on to clarify exactly the "rights"
referred to in subsection (1):
"The rights referred to in para.1 of this article
are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal state
does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its
natural resources, no one may undertake these
activities or make a claim to the continental shelf,
without the express consent of the coastal state."
It seems that the Gulf treaty differs to the
article above which is also similar to the doctrine
expressed in the Truman Proclamation. "Sovereign
rights" in Art. 2 of the Convention is "for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting" the natural
resources of the continental shelf. The sovereign
rights stated in the treaty are quite specifically
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over the seabed and sUbsoil; it states also the
respective areas were claimed as " natural
territory." The continental shelf, in the context of
the Truman Proclamation and the 1958 convention, is
not the national territory of a state. (34)
The 1958 conference on the Law of The Sea:
Each convention will be examined separately for
convience. Both the U.K. and Venezuela participated
in the conference - but they signed and ratified the
convention on different dates. Trinidad and Tobago
gave its notification of succession and acceded to
the convention on the continental Shelf some time
after its independence. (35)
The Convention On The Territorial Sea and The
contiguous Zone:
On September 23, 1958 the U.K. signed this
Convention and ratified it on March 14,1960.
Venezuela signed it on October 30, 1961. (36)
On ratifying the Convention Venezuela declared an
express reservation with respect to Art. 12 and para.
2 and 3 of Art. 24. The U.K. placed on record an
objection to Venezuela's reservation on 5th Aug.,
1962.
In 1956, Venezuela extended its territorial sea to
12 miles. It expressed the view then that a three
mile teritorial sea was outdated, outmoded and
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inconsistent with the pace of modern technology. (37)
As a result of this extension Venezuela's territorial
sea overlapped submarine areas governed in the Gulf
of Paria treaty.
The U.K adhered to a 3 mile territorial sea
(Territorial Water Jurisdition Act 1878). (38) This
1878 Act extended to Trinidad and Tobago.
Trinidad and Tobago gave notification of succession
to the continental Shelf Convention on April 11,
1966. (39) This notification did not contain any
declaration, reservation or objections.
In the Territorial Sea Act of 1969, Trinidad and
Tobago declared a 12 mile territorial sea. section 3
of this Act, like the Venezuela Act provides, "where
the outer limits of the territorial sea of Trinidad
and Tobago intersect foreign territorial waters the
outer limits therefore shall be resolved through
agreement or other means recognized by international
law." Thus it was felt then that the Act provided a
framework to discuss matters relating to fixing of
boundaries where the waters intersect.
The 1958 continental Shelf Convention;
Venezuela signed the Convention on October 30,
1958 and ratified it on 15th Aug., 1961 with the
following reservations:-
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"In signing the present convention the Republic of
Venezuela declares with reference to Art.6 that there
are special circumstances to be taken into
consideration in the following areas: the Gulf of
Paria insofar as the boundary is not determined by
existing agreements and in zones adjacent thereto;
the area between the coast of Venezuela and the
island of Aruba and the Gulf of Venezuela." (emphasis
added)
Art. 6 of the 1958 continental Shelf Convention,
provides for a method of delimation of the
continental shelf where the same shelf is adjacent or
opposite to two or more states; the median line
method line method could be used. It is interesting
to note that the boundaries specified in the Gulf of
Paria treaty are not in accordance with the median
line priniciple. (40)
What does Venezuela mean by special circumstances?
This will be discussed in the next chapter.
Trinidad and Tobago became an independent state
soon after Venezuela ratified the Convention and
since the U.K. did not ratify it until May 11,1964,
the U.K. objections no longer extended to Trinidad
and Tobago.
Trinidad and Tobago acceded to the Convention on
11th July, 1968, almost six years after its
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independence. It did not give notice to any
objections or reservations on acceding to the
Convention, and to date has not placed on record any
objection to the Venezuela reservation. Therefore
Trinidad and Tobago has implied that it accepted the
Venezuela reservation with respect to the Gulf of
Paria and zones adjacent thereto.
This treaty can be useful as a precedent for future
bilateral agreements.
Summary:
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The future expansion of oil exploration and
production is expected to take place on the
continental shelf. This chapter discussed the
continental shelf within the 1958 and 1982 Law of the
Sea Convention.
Since it is now a principle of customary
International law that coastal states have exclusive
rights of exploration over their seaward extension of
the shelf, most states enact mining laws to regulate
the exploration and exploitation of all hydrocarbon
resources within their sovereign jurisdiction.
Trinidad and Tobago enacted the continental Shelf Act
1969 and amended it in 1982.
The 1942 Gulf of Paria treaty between United
Kingdom and Venezuela is the first international
agreement reached between opposite states concerning
the division of submarine areas. In this treaty each
party recognised a claim to sovereignty by the other;
whereas in the 1945 Truman Proclamation the U.S.
declared that it would excercise juridiction and
control over the natural resources of its continental
shelf and not sovereignty.
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Chapter 4: Maritime Practices of Trinidad and Tobago
and Venezuela
study Area
For purposes of conveniences the areas to be
considered are separated as follows:
a) The area north of Point A on the line AB
specified in Art.3 of the Gulf of Paria treaty, 1942.
(see map 10) This is north of the island of Patos
the Dragon's Mouth. Also the area north of Trinidad's
north coast, and west of Tobago and which forms part
of the Margarita-Tobago continental shelf. (see map
10 and 11) This delimitation is between
Grenada/Trinidad and Tobago/Barbados.
b) The area in the Serpents Mouth east of
Point X of the line YX described in Art. 3 of the
Gulf of Paria treaty 1942, and which forms part of
the Orinoco delta shelf (map 10). It is north of
Punta Mariusa and Punta Baja in Venezuela. This
boundary is on the south coast of Trinidad and Tobago
with Venezuela.
c) The area east of Point Galeota, Trinidad
and north of Point Punta Playa, Venezuela at the end
of its straight baseline.
1 0 1
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Economic Charateristics Of study Area:
a) Areas north of Patos
These areas are part of what is known as the
Margarita-Tobago shelf. It extends in an east - west
direction between the islands of Margarita and
Tobago. Its northern boundary is the 200 meter
isobath and the southern boundary, the north coast of
Trinidad and Venezuela. (see Map 11)
This shelf is described as one of possible petroleum
importance. In 1971-1972, six exploratory wells,
specifically to the north and north-east of Trinidad,
were drilled. Four were dry, one was non-commercial
gas and one discovered a commercial deposit of gas
which the government of Trinidad and Tobago is
exploiting. (1)
Areas in this shelf has been leased and have been
divided for competitive bidding. (2) (see map 6) The
waters above these areas are attractive fishing
grounds.
Trinidad and Tobago, acting in accordance with its
general policy and its Continental Shelf Act, (3) has
leased and divided certain areas for competitive
bidding. Charts and maps have been published and to
date there are no protests or objections from
Venezuela or Grenada. (4)
b) Areas East of Serpent's Mouth
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This area is a rich fishing ground especially for
shrimp. It is part of the Orinoco delta shelf (see
map 11). It is a predominantly shallow area with
maximum depths of 40 fathoms (approx. 74m), is
regarded as favorable for exploration and
exploitation in the light of hydrocarbon
accumulations, and is already being exploited on a
commercial basis.
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c) Areas East and North East Of Point
Galeota
These areas have vast potential and are already being
exploited on a commercial basis (see map 11). In view
of its large potential and of recent statements that
Venezuela proposes to begin explorations in the area,
the question of defining boundaries becomes important
and necessary. (5)
The Venezuelan Approach To Delimitation Of The
continental Shelf:
When considering the Venezuela approach of
the Continental shelf in its relationship with
Trinidad and Tobago it is necessary to examine the
articles of its constitution which are relevant:
The 1953 Venezuela Constitution:
Art.2 of this constitution provides that:
" ..... also sUbject to its authority and
jurisdiction are the bed of the sea and the subsoil
of the areas that constitute the continental shelf as
well as any islands that may be formed or that appear
in the zone ..... "
"Neither the territory nor the zones subject to the
authority and jurisdiction of Venezuela may be
alienated, ceded or leased in any manner to a foreign
state or states nor to anyone having, representing or
managing their rights ..... " (6)
Venezuela therefore claimed sovereignty or
ownership over the continental shelf, not sovereign
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting
the natural resources in the shelf which is provided
for in art.2 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
continental Shelf.
The 1961 Venezuela Constitution:
Art. 2 of the 1953 Constitution was modified
in Art. 7 of the 1961 Constitution. It now reads:
" ..... the sovereignty, authority and vigilance over
the territorial sea, the contiguous maritime zone,
the continental shelf and the air space, as well as
the owership and exploitation of property and
resources contained within them, shall be examined to
the extent and conditions determined by law."
Art. 8:
"The national territory may never be ceded,
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transferred, or leased or alienated in any way, even
partially or temporarily, to a foreign power .... "
Although the words are re-arranged and the old
article paraphrased on the lines of modern
legislative drafting it connotes the same meaning.
The Venezuelan law on the territorial sea and
the continental shelf ordains that Venezuela's
territorial sea and continental shelf are part of the
national territory. This is not in conformity with
the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea or
the 1982 Convention. This attitude is strange in that
Venezuela signed and ratified the 1958 Convention on
the Continental Shelf.
Venezuelan municipal law on the sea (1956) is
in accord with the constitution, hence its validity
with the state. Thus, it is accepted law that the
laws of a state do not extend to another state
unless, which is very unlikely, the other state
agrees to it. Since then the 1958 Conventions on the
Law of the Sea have not been incorporated into the
corpus of Venezuelan statute law. Therefore in
relationships between Venezuela and other states the
Convention takes precedence over the municipal
legislation.(?)
Delimitation: (Venezuela's possible Approach)
Once more I refer to the reservation of
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Venezuela with respect to the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the continental Shelf. The reservation reads:
"In signing the present convention, the
Republic of Venezuela declares with reference to Art.
6 that there are special circumstances to be taken
into consideration in the following areas: the Gulf
of Paria insofar as the boundary is not determined by
existing agreements and in zones adjacent thereto;
the areas between the coast of Venezuela and the
island of Aruba; and the Gulf of Venezuela,"
(emphasis added). (8)
To the author "zones adjacent thereto" are
those zones or study areas a), b) and c) referred to
in the beginning of this chapter.
What Are Special Circumstances?
The continental shelf must be of immense
importance to Venezuela because of the extent of
Venezuela's coastline and for economic and security
reasons.
The considerations were highlighted by the
Venezuelan delegate at the U.N. conference prior to
the signing of the 1958 Convention on the Law of the
Sea. The view was expressed by the Venezuelan
delegate that different formulae ought to be applied
according to the circumstances in each case and the
median line principle was rejected on the ground that
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"it is not possible to accept such an idea without
taking into account the circumstances in each area
and each state, and probably also other
considerations of a scientific nature."(9) (emphasis
added)
The delegate went on to state that, "it is
the understanding and contention of Venezuela that
the coastal state always has a preferential right to
establish rules in such cases."(lD) The Venezuelan
pOlicy is based upon geographical and economic
factors with petroleum deposits highest on the list
of priorities.
Delimitation Of Continental Shelf (Venezuelan
Perspective)
In the light of Venezuela's reservations to
Art. 6 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf - which provide for delimitation of
the continental shelf of opposite or adjacent states
- it is essential to see what method Venezuela may
apply to the problem.
Art.6 of the 1958 Convention states:
"1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to
the territories of two or more states whose coasts
are opposite each other, the boundary of the
continental shelf appertaining to such states shall
be determined by agreement between them. In the
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Shelf allows for reservation of any article except 1
to 3 inclusive. Further the right to make a
reservation to the remaining articles of this
convention is recognized by the International Court
of Justice. (11)
Article 1 reads: The term "continental shelf" is used
as referring a) to the seabed and the subsoil of the
submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the
area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters
or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas; b) to the seabed
and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to
the coasts of islands.
Article 3 reads: The rights of the coastal states
over the continental shelf do not affect the legal
status of the superjacent waters as high seas, or
that of the airspace above those waters.
Therefore as far as Venezuela is concerned it is not
bound by these articles vis-a-vis Trinidad and
Tobago ..
What then are the methods proposed or will be
suggested by Venezuela?
To answer this, let us look at the
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absence of agreement, and unless another boundary
line is justified by special circumstances, the
boundary is the median line, every point of which is
equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines
from which the breath of the territorial sea of each
state is measured.
2. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to
the territories of two adjacent states, the boundary
of the continental shelf shall be determined by
agreement between them. In the absence of agreement,
and unless another boundary line is justified by
special circumstances, the boundary shall be
determined by application of the principle of
equidistance from the nearest points of the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each
state is measured.
3. In delimiting the boundaries of the continental
shelf, any lines which are drawn in accordance with
the principles set out in para. 1 and 2 of this
article should be defined with reference to charts
and geographical features as they exist at a
particular date, and reference should be made to
fixed permanent identifiable points on the land.
Art. 12 of the 1958 Convention on the continental
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Venezuelan law on the territorial sea and the
continental shelf. Art. 1 provides:
"In the event that the boundary established
by this present article intersects foreign
territorial waters, the question will be resolved
through agreements or other means recognised by
international law."(12)
It is quite clear that the Venezuelan law
envisages and permits resolving the question of
delimitation of the boundary by agreements but in
modern times one cannot reach an agreement without
the application of rules which in this instance must
be a means recognised by international law.
It seems that in arriving at an agreement
Venezuela will consider the configuration of the
coast, economic factors - petroleum deposits in the
sea-bed and subsoil being of paramount importance -
and protection of its resources. Yet there is the
question of what are the "other means recognised by
international law?" Since the solution cannot be Art.
6 of the 1958 Convention on the continental Shelf,
the answer must be sought from principles of
customary international law and precedents set by the
International Court of Justice.
According to Art.1 of the 1958 Convention on
the continental Shelf, a state's continental shelf
begins where the territorial sea ends. This is the
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as distinct from the geographical
continuation of the land mass
legal definition,
meaning which is a
under the sea. (13)
Venezuela uses Art. 3-13 of the 1958
Territorial Sea convention to identify its baselines.
Venezuela has adopted and applied these articles for
example in defining the baseline at the Orinoco Delta
Art. 13 was used for it is apparent that with regard
to delimitation of the continental shelf, it can be
presumed that Venezuela will resort to the rules of
customary international law.
Venezuela: Practice with respect to delimitation
The Gulf of Paria treaty was discussed in
chapter 3. In that case the negotiations were of a
bilateral nature. In Venezuela's reservation to the
1958 Convention, two other areas are specified,
namely, the area between the coast of Venezuela and
the island of Aruba and the Gulf of Venezuela. These
areas are similar in some respects (geographically)
to the areas between Trinidad and Tobago and
Venezuela which have not been delimited .
Venezuela/Colombia Dispute
It would be useful to examine the Venezuelan
approach to the Venezuela/Colombia problem in the
Gulf of Venezuela to see Venezuela's general policy
113
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on such an issue.
The present dispute concerns the respective
claims of Colombia and Venezuela to the territorial
sea and continental shelf rights in the Gulf of
Venezuela. Particularly at stake is the income from
proven oil deposits and valuable minerals in the
seabed of the Gulf.
The claims of both countries overlap.
Colombia claims that the territorial sea and
continental shelf rights in the Gulf should be
resolved by use of the median or equidistance line,
drawn according to the so called Boggs procedure,
which was prepared by the u.s. Geographer
S. Whittemore Boggs in 1951.(15) On the other hand,
Venezuela relies upon historical title to the Gulf
and other special circumstances, and argues that
since the 1941 treaty between the two countries makes
no mention of territorial rights in the Gulf, silence
does not forfeit any long-held Venezuelan interests
in the Gulf. (16) Venezuela states that an
equidistance line would divide the water roughly
equally for states with straight or nearly straight
coastlines. In other case, such as the Gulf of
Venezuela, an equidistance line would
disproportionately favor one party in this case
Colombia. (17)
On July 20, 1975, the President of Colombia
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in a speech before Colombian Congress proposed a
"joint condominium" over the Gulf of Venezuela as a
solution to the delimitation dispute. On the
Colombian side everyone was in favor, while on the
Venezuelan side almost everyone was against. This
condominum proposal is examined briefly here for
consideration of joint programmes between Trinidad
and Tobago and Venezuela. In international law
condominums exist when two or more states exercise
joint sovereignty over a particular territory as for
example the area between Iceland and Jan Mayen
(Norway) 1981.
Joint jurisdiction and joint exploitation
occasionally offer an obvious alternative solution to
a dispute concerning overlapping claims to the
continental shelf that contains valuable resources.
It is suggested that the application of those
principles to the Venezuela/Colombia dispute would
not be feasible. These countries are neither morally
willing nor technologically prepared to initiate such
an undertaking. Such an arrangement, inevitably would
not meet the economic expectations of the two
parties. Therefore precise delimitation of the area
should be applied . This thesis cannot adhere to a
condominium proposal for the undelimited areas off
Trinidad and Tobago, because of the reasons above.
According to Klock the principles that should
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be used to delimit this area should be:
a) A nation should be allowed to adopt its
delimitation to practical needs and local
requirements. While Venezuela has traditionally been
a "maritime" nation, Colombia has been a
"continental" nation. Thus it seems unfair to permit
Colombia, which has ignored these waters - until the
possibility of oil exploitation was raised - to apply
the median line in its favor.
b) Degree of proportionality between the
length of the coast and the marine area.
c) Historical usage and local economic
interests in the waters to be considered in
delimitation. Venezuela has always been economically
dependent on its coast and the Gulf. In fact the
major oil deposits in Venezuela are located offshore
in Lake Maracaibo, only a few miles inland from the
Gulf. Futhermore, discovery and production of oil on
the Gulf's continental shelf would be directly tied
to commercial activities in nearby Maracaibo. To
Venezuela, they could efficiently develop this Gulf
of Venezuela-Lake Maracaibo region as a single
economic zone. (18)
This principle could be used to delimit the
areas off the coast of Trinidad and Tobago. (This
will be discussed in chapter 5)
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Agreed Venezuelan Boundary Lines:
In the agreement between Venezuela and the
Dominican Republic (1979), the preamble refers to
delimiting the boundary 'justly, accurately and on
the basis of equitable principles.' The median line
was used to delimit this line. (19)
In the agreement between the u.s and
Venezuela, (1978) reference has been made to "the
need to establish precise and equitable maritime
limits," and "according to International Law." The
boundary line between Puerto Rico and Venezuela, is a
median line, and gives full effect to the Aves Island
of Venezuela. (20)
The Treaty between the Netherlands and
Venezuela, (1978) was a comprehensive one and dealt
with the maritime boundary between the Netherlands
Antilles and the Venezuelan mainland and islands. The
boundary was drawn in four sectors.
sector A between Aruba and the Venezuelan
territory.
Sector B - between the Leeward Islands of the
Netherlands Antilles (Aruba, Bonaire and Curacao) and
the Northern coast of Venezuela.
Sector C - between Bonaire and the Venezuelan
territory.
Sector D - between the Venezuelan islands of Aves and
the Netherlands islands of Saba and st.
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Eustatius.(See Map 13)
The boundary line in Sectors A, B, and C is a
negotiated line, whereas in Sector D it is the median
line. The Treaty refers to the delimitation of their
respective marine and submarine areas in a manner
which is "just, precise and based on equitable
principles."(21)
So it seems that Venezuela modifies its boundaries to
suit it needs.
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Delimitation
Of View:
A Possible Trinidad and Tobago Point
In order to arrive at Trinidad and Tobago's
policy on this question it would be necessary to
examine Trinidad and Tobago's attitude toward
international treaties, conventions, and
participation at conferences; its municipal
legislation and general practice in its relations
with Venezuela.
On July 11, 1968, almost six years after its
independence, Trinidad and Tobago notified the
Secretary General of the U.N. that it had acceded to
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
without any reservations or objection. (22) Venezuela
signed the said Convention on October 30, 1958, with
reservation and ratified it with an expressed
reservation in respect to Art. 6.
also use the
6 to its
The U.K. signed the Convention on September
9, 1958 and ratified it on May 11, 1964, with an
objection to Art. 6 paras. 1 and 2 with respect to a
reservation made by France. (23)
The U.K. ratified the Convention after the
independence of Trinidad and Tobago. Its objections
also related to a reservation by France. In any event
any objection by the U.K. at that time cannot affect
Trinidad and Tobago - Venezuela.
Since Trinidad and Tobago is bound by this
Convention it has accepted the method of delimitation
specified in Art. 6. Therefore in the absence of any
agreement (which there is none) between Trinidad and
Tobago - Venezuela on any special circumstances,
Trinidad and Tobago adheres to the median line
principle. Trinidad and Tobago has signed and
ratified the 1982 Convention also.
But Trinidad and Tobago can
reservation made by Venezuela to Art.
advantage, i.e., use "special circumstance" to
delimit the maritime boundaries in area a, band c,
(chapter 3) using the economic benefit of these areas
to Trinidad and Tobago.
Trinidad and Tobago Municipal Legislation:
In 1969 Trinidad and Tobago passed two acts
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which dealt with the territoral sea and the
continental shelf. (24) In 1986 bills were passed in
The House of Representative which amended these two
acts. (25) Also in 1986, a bill was passed declaring
Trinidad and Tobago an archipelagic state (26).
Territorial Sea Act 1969
This Act establishes the width of the
territorial sea of Trinidad and Tobago at 12 miles.
The purpose of the 1986 bill is to affect amendments
to the Territorial Sea Act, consequent upon the new
formulations for the measurement of the internal
waters and the territorial sea of coastal states,
introduced by the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of
the Sea.
Sect.5 of the amendment substitutes:
"The baseline from which the territorial sea shall be
measured shall be the low water line along the coast
of the island of Trinidad and of 'the island of Tobago
as well as the coast of all other islands that form
part of Trinidad and Tobago." in the 1969 Act for:
"The baselines from which the breath of the
territorial sea shall be measured shall be straight
archipelagic baselines."(27) This relates to the 1986
Bill declaring Trinidad and Tobago an archipelagic
state.
Since both states have territorial sea of 12
miles the seas intersect at several points. So the
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problem will have to be resolved through agreements
or other means. But whereas Trinidad and Tobago
accepts Art. 12 of the convention on the Territorial
Sea Venezuela has not, since Venezuela had a
reservation to this article on delimitation of the
territorial sea.
The Continental Shelf Act of Trinidad and Tobago
The 1969 Act is an Act to make provision as
to the exploration and exploitation of the
continental shelf. Sect.2 of the Act re-enacts with
minor modifications and drafting changes the
definition of the term "continental shelf" in Art.1
of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.
Trinidad and Tobago, like Venezuela, adopted in its
local law the 200-meter isobath criteria as well as
the exploitability standard but unlike Venezuela did
not provide that the shelf is national territory.
The 1986 amendment of the Continental Shelf
Act Sect.2 substitutes a new definition of
"continental shelf" as follows:
"continental shelf means the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas of Trinidad and Tobago
that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the
natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of its continental margin, or to a
distance of two hundred nautical miles from the
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baselines from which the breath of the territorial
sea of Trinidad and Tobago is measured, where the
outer edge of the continental margin does not extend
up to that distance."
This definition is in keeping with Art. 76
Sect.1 of the 1982 Convention. Trinidad and Tobago
has signed and ratified this convention.
Neither the 1969 Act or the 1986 amendment
provide any method of delimitation, so on an
international sphere Trinidad and Tobago adheres to
the method prescribed in Art.83 of the 1982 Geneva
Convention, which reads:
"The delimitation of the continental shelf
between states with opposite or adjacent coasts shall
be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, as referred to in Art.38 of the
statute of the International Court of Justice, in
order to achieve an equitable solution."(emphasis
added)
Venezuela has not signed the 1982 Convention,
but it seems that it would choose the parts suited to
its advantage, ego extend its continental shelf to
200 miles, yet abide by the 1958 convention.
The 1986 Act Declaring Trinidad and Tobago an
Archipelagic state and The EEZ. (No. 15 of 1986
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The main object of the Act is to implement
certain provisions of the 1982 U.N. Convention on the
Law of the Sea, relating to the archipelagic waters
and the EEZ, including the nature and extent of the
jurisdiction to be exercised in each of these areas
as well as matters connected therewith.
Part II of the Act declares the Republic of
Trinidad and Tobago an archipelagic state and defines
the area of the archipelagic waters. The Act also
states that the archipelagic baselines of Trinidad
and Tobago shall consist of straight baselines; it
goes on to state that the breath of the territorial
sea, the continental shelf and the EEZ shall be
measured from the archipelagic baselines. (see map 14)
It further explains that existing agreements
and treaties affecting areas falling within the
archipelagic waters are to be respected (e.g., Gulf
of Paria treaty) but provision is made for new
bilateral agreements to be entered into with other
states. (28)
Trinidad and Tobago Practice with Respect To
Delimitation
Trinidad and Tobago does not have a dispute
with any country at present with respect to
delimitation of its continental shelf. But Trinidad
and Tobago is confidentially preparing itself for
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negotiations with Venezuela in the near future. The
disputed area will be the maritime boundaries on the
east coast and the south east coast between Trinidad
and Tobago and Venezuela.
Trinidad and Tobago's policy with respect to
delimitation of the continental shelf, is that it
recognises that it shares a common shelf with
Venezuela and that certain areas were delimited by
mutual agreement in the Gulf of Paria Treaty, 1942.
In the absence of a common shelf with
opposite/adjacent countries Trinidad and Tobago
claims sovereignty over the resources of its shelf up
to the continental margin or to where the depth
admits of exploitability. (29)
Trinidad and Tobago thus relies on the legal
principles established by the Geneva Conventions of
1958 and 1982, as well as examples of precedents and
modern concepts in the Law of the Sea to support her
position on the matter. The exploitability criteria
is demonstrated in the last grant of production
sharing contracts in 1974; licenses were granted in
waters depths up to two thousand feet. (30) The
availability of technology to exploit the resources
of the shelf can mean a steadily expanding breadth of
the continental shelf for Trinidad and Tobago, if she
possesses the technology herself or can import it by
harnessing the technological resources of the
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international petroleum companies to exploit at
greater depths.
In this respect therefore, Trinidad and
Tobago is justified in claiming rights over as much
of the continental shelf as can be exploited. Her
claims to the east would be limited only by the
extent to which they impinge on the equitable claims
of other states. It appears that Trinidad and Tobago
would like to establish a claim over the continental
shelf on the east coast to a distance of
approximately 240 miles. (31)
Mr. Carl Hudson Phillips (attorney-General
of Trinidad and Tobago) on November 4, 1971, at the
Ministerial meeting of Commonwealth Caribbean
countries held in Barbados, stated:
"Trinidad and Tobago adheres firmly to
geomorphological criteria in determining the outer
limit of the continental shelf. This Trinidad and
Tobago considers to be a natural prolongation seaward
of its land domain."
This principle was applied by the
International Court of Justice in arriving at a
jUdgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases,
February 20, 1969. The geomorphological principle,
which hinges on the idea that the continental shelf
is clearly an extension of something already
possessed, is now a determinant principle in claims
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to the continental shelf.
The Court determined that:-
" the rights of the coastal states in respect
of the area of the continental shelf that constitutes
a natural prolongation of its land territory into and
under the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio by
virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an
extension of it in an exercise of soverign rights for
the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting
its natural resources." (32)
Trinidad and Tobago actively supported this
position at the U.N Conference on the Law of the Sea,
when she suggested that the Trinidad and Tobago Law
of the Sea delegation adopt the following definition
of the continental shelf:
liThe continental shelf of a coastal state
extends beyond its territorial sea throughout the
natural prolongation of its land territory." (33)
It is likely that there could be a 'collision
of rights' between Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada on
this issue. However, in terms of the geomorphological
principle defined in technical terms of location of
the continental shelf between Trinidad and Tobago and
Grenada, the former appears to have a strong case.
In areas of the continental shelf to the
south and southeast which were not defined by the
Gulf of Paria Treaty, the licensed acreages awarded
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by Trinidad and Tobago veer south of the
international treaty line which extends abruptly
midway across the Columbus Channel. Trinidad and
Tobago limits the southeasterly extension of her
continental shelf by what she considers to be the
median line in the waters separating this territory
from Venezuela. (34)
Though there has been no agreement between
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela on delimitation of
the area, the portion claimed by the former has been
awarded to companies under licences. This seems to
gain a great measure of legality from the apparent
consent, recognition or acquiescense of other states.
In international law any state is free to
claim any portion of the sea appertaining to its land
the legality of such a claim depends on consent,
recognition or acquiescense of other states. (35)
This position was established by the World Court in
the Anglo - Norwegian Fisheries Case of 1951 between
Norway and the U.K.
Venezuela has not yet protested about
Trinidad and Tobago's unilateral awards in the study
area. As a result of Venezuela's acquiescense in this
area, eventually under international law Venezuela
might be prevented from laying claim to the areas
effectively occupied by Trinidad and Tobago. Thus
Venezuela's continuing silence on the issue will mean
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that she tacitly agrees with the actions of Trinidad
and Tobago in the area.
Trinidad and Tobago seems to be using the
rationale of the North Sea continental Shelf Cases
that if the state effectively occupies the areas
beyond the territorial sea off the east coast, then
it could perhaps come to an agreement with the
neighbouring states if the area occupied is under
dispute. The argument here is there could be no
apportionment of something which does not belong to
anyone, and which remains an integral, undisputed,
undivided whole.
The 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
would be used to emphasize this point:
"Any dispute about boundaries must involve
....... a marginal or fringe area to which both
parties are laying claim. So that any delimitation
of it which does not leave it wholly to one of the
parties will in practice divide it between them in
certain shares or operate as if such a division had
been made." (36)
It should nevertheless be emphasized then
that Trinidad and Tobago has tried to ensure that the
boundaries of the licensed areas are well within the
limits of the continental shelf to which this country
can legally lay claim in accordance with established
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principles of international law. The very fact
Trinidad and Tobago has given out licenses in these
areas indicates that the state is offering the
international petroleum companies a guarantee that it
has exclusive sovereign rights to the resources of
the area.
It is most desirable that all potential
issues over the delimitation of the continental shelf
between Trinidad and Tobago and other coastal states
of the Caribbean be resolved peacefully. Customary
international law provides the basis for possible
solutions set within the framework of the 1958 and
1982 Geneva Conventions, and also precedents set by
the International Court of Justice jUdgments.
Firstly, in cases of dispute, "the wisest
solution is to leave the parties free in each case to
determine by agreement between themselves the most
appropriate frontier line."e3?) In the absence of a
treaty and in cases where the countries are parties
to the Convention, delimitation may be based on the
principle of "special circumstances," which takes
into consideration equitable principles, historic
rights and economic benefit. Failing this, the
equidistance principles may be applied. But this
principle is not in itself a binding principle of
customary international law since the use of the
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median line may lead in some cases to inequitable
results.
The geography, geology and geomorphological
characteristics of Trinidad and Tobago are largely
responsible for the direction of her policy on
matters related to her continental shelf. It is a
question of how could her policy on these issues best
serve the national interest and maximize the economic
and fiscal benefits to the state.
Her policy is consistent with that of her
Latin American neighbours, in that she desires
maximum economic jurisdiction over the maritime
resources and wishes to excerise her sovereign rights
over the most extensive area possible of the
continental shelf. The very fact that Trinidad and
Tobago went beyond the 200 mile limit set by the 1958
Convention in awarding licences to explore and
exploit petroleum, demonstrates that she found the
criterion unacceptable in terms of national
interests.
The greater the extent of ocean space over
which Trinidad and Tobago has sovereign rights to
explore and exploit, the greater is the likelihood of
discovery of large exploitable reserves of
hydrocarbon resources by the international petroleum
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companies operating
Trinidad and Tobago
shelf for much of
prosperity.
under license from this state.
looks toward the continental
her present welfare and future
Barbados and Grenada's Views of Delimitation
Both Barbados and Grenada were colonies of
the U.K. In 1966 Barbados became independent; Grenada
did so in 1974. Both countries are not parties to the
1958 Territorial Sea or Continental Shelf
Conventions. But both countries have signed the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
Barbados in 1977 declared a 12-mile territorial sea;
in this Act archipelagic straight baselines were also
declared. (38)
In the 1978 Marine Boundaries and Jurisdiction Act,
Barbados declared a 200 mile EEZ.
a 12-mile
archipelagic
declared
declared
1978Grenada in
territorial sea and also
straight baselines. (39)
These two countries stated in their legislation, that
if there is no agreement between the parties
disputing a boundary then the median line would
operate as the residual rule.
Both countries at present have no maritime
boundary disputes with any country.
Summary:
Venezuela did not sign the 1958 Geneva
Convention, but placed a reservation to Article 6;
"zones adjacent thereto" stated in this reservation
refers to those zones or study area described in this
chapter.
Trinidad and Tobago can use this reservation
to its advantage ie., use "special circumstances" to
delimit the maritime boundaries in the study areas -
emphasizing the economic benefit of these areas to
Trinidad and Tobago.
In any boundary delimitation account should
be taken of the difference in each area and each case
should be considered on its own merit; this was
viewed by the Venezuelan delegate to the U.N.
conference prior to the signing of the 1958 law of
the sea conference.
The precedence set by Venezuela in its agreed
boundary lines are on the basis of equitable
principles ego The Dominican Republic and Venezuela
boundary. In the case of the dispute between
Venezuela and Colombia Venezuela relies upon
historical tit~e and other special circumstances.
Trinidad and Tobago relies on the legal
principles established by the Geneva conventions of
1958 and 1982, as well as examples of precedents and
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modern concepts in the law of the sea to support her
postion on delirnation.
Chapter 5: Maritime Boundary delimitation Principles
and Precedents set by the International Court of
Justice, and other International Tribunals.
The international community of nations is
struggling with the vexing problems of the
establishment of off-shore boundaries; presumably
each state hopes to maximize its economic advantage,
while minimizing interference with traditional
freedoms of access.
Art. 6 of the 1958 continental Shelf Convention
dealt with delimitation. This article has a three
prong approach, in that it states .... the boundary
should be determined by agreement; if there is no
agreement and no special circumstances which can
influence the boundary line, then the median line or
equisdistant principle should be used. The article
does not explain what is ~eant by special
circumstances.
All social structures are sUbject to change. The
Law of the Sea is no exception. UNCLOS III provided
the occasion for a shift of fashions. The criteria
for delineation of the continental shelf between
opposite/adjacent states changed from a "specific"
into a "diffuse" mode; from the "median line
principle" and "special circumstances" into
"equitable solutions", the 1982 Law of the Sea
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Convention being the new savoir faire. (1) The new
delimitation criteria are couched in the following
terms in Art. 83 of the 1982 convention.
Article 83 reads: "The delimitation of the
continental shelf between states with opposite or
adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the
basis of international law as referred to in article
38 of the state statute of the International court of
Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution"
(emphasis added)
This development leaves the settlement of criteria
for stipulation of boundaries to the negotiating
parties, while at the same time the scope for
consideration of regional characteristics is
enlarged. "Special Circumstances" now denotes not
only geographical factors; also political, legal,
demographic and economic features (resource interest
ie. usage) of the regions in question may be taken
account of.
Special Circumstances/Equity:
It seems therefore, when one refers to special
circumstances one is referring to equity, therefore
circumstances can be viewed as a means of creating
equity and should play an important role in
delimitation of the area.
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The seaward extension of coastal states'
jurisdiction is aimed at acquiring rights to the
resources and the purpose of delimitation of the
boundary is to clarify such rights between states. In
1958 the residual rule was equidistance. In recent
years we have seen several developments by the
International court of Justice in the decisions on
settlement of boundary disputes. In the North Sea
continental Shelf Case of 1969, the Court ruled that
the continental shelf, a natural prolongation of the
land territory, should be delimited in accordance
with equitable principle, taking account of all
relevant circumstances. The Court also held that Art.
6 of the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention was not a
principle of customary international law. (2)
It was as a result of this case that we have the
emergence of 'equity' as the guiding principle or
method. "Equity does not necessarily imply equality
...... " (3) But with an equitable line the result
should be fair to the parties involved. Art. 83 of
the 1982 Convention says that the objective of
maritime boundary delimitation should be to achieve
an equitable solution. The role of equity is still
left to be defined, but it became the new concept in
settling maritime boundary disputes.
The Anglo-French case gave the rule of equity a
final imprint. The Court stated that the fundamental
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that based on
an equitable
principle in the delimitation of maritime areas
between opposite/adjacent states is
equity, the object being to achieve
line. (4)
In the 1982 jUdgment of the Tunisia/Libya Case the
court affirms that "the delimitation is to be
affected in accordance with equitable principles, and
taking account of all relevant circumstances; the
principles are subordinate to the goal." The term
'equitable principles' cannot be interpreted in the
abstract. The equity of any principle depends on
whether it produces a just result in the
circumstances of the particular case. (5)
In the U.S./Canada jUdgment in 1984, the Court
stated "the present jUdgment can be summed up in four
words: the result is equitable. It seems equity is to
some extent in the eyes of the beholder." (6)
Equity As A Rule
Equity as pursued in International Court of Justice
decisions is the main principle on which maritime
delimitation may safely rest, notwithstanding the
fact that special circumstances and economic
dependence or historic titles may act as corollaries
to determine whether the application of the
equidistant method would be tantamount, in a given
case to equity. (7)
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Indeed, what makes the median or equidistant line
equitable or not is the presence (or absence) and
regard (or disregard) of special geographical
circumstances such as islands, or the shape of the
coast (convex or concave), but also special
circumstances, such as economic dependence on
resources in the delimited area together with
best boundary
states accept
the
both
that
theoneisstatesbetween
historical usage.
Hodgson stressed the fact that "while equidistance
is not the sole basis for the the delimitation of the
continental shelf, the principle has been enshrined
as unquestionable 'conventional wisdom,' for maritime
limits. It is the only method mentioned in both the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
continental Shelf and, as a consequence, states find
the concept easy to accept due to its proper
'sanctification.' (8)
Nweihed himself states
peacefully. (9).
The difficulty between lines of equidistance and
limits founded on equitable principles has been
finessed by the reference to Art. 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, which
emphasizes equitable solutions.
The tribunal in the U.K./France dispute, noted that
the jUdgment in the North Sea Case contained the
assertion that there is no legal limit on the
considerations which states can use in order to
ensure equitable procedures. (10) Brown, as referred
to by Prescott, has picked up this point and asked,
why the jUdges in the North Sea Case did not consider
population size, per capita income, dependence of
industry on shelf resources and the relative poverty
of land resources. (11) Nor will some states accept
the view of these two international tribunals that it
is not the purpose of an equitable solution to create
a situation of complete equity when geography and
nature have established an inequity. (12)
It is all very well for international judges to
argue that equity calls for a suitable abatement of
disproportionate effects of special geographical
circumstances; for politicians with electorates to
satisfy equity is likely to mean at least
equality. (13)
Since there is no restriction on the range of
issues which can be introduced into the debate about
an equitable solution, the debate might be long,
especially when there is a marked discrepancy between
the parties.
Circumstances Which May Complicate Maritime Boundary
Negotiations
The settlement of any international maritime
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are no
in which
definite
boundary faces the basic problem that there
precise rules governing the manner
negotiations should be conducted, and no
principles to guide the parties.
Art.83 of the 1982 Convention now requires the
delimitation of maritime boundaries to be based on
international law, as referred to in Art. 38 of the
statute of the International Court of Justice, in
order to achieve an equitable solution. Alas, Art. 38
does not provide much help. It enjoins the courts to
reach decisions by applying international conventions
expressly recognised by the contesting states; by
international customs, by the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations which implies
that there are uncivilized nations; and by jUdical
decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified pUblicists. Most international lawyers
suggest that there is nothing in this prescription to
prevent any state from raising any matter it wants in
support of a particUlar boundary alignment which will
suit it.(14)
It is this lack of restriction on arguments which
might be raised that accounts for the wide range of
circumstances which might create complications for
boundary negotiations. Circumstances which could
complicate boundary negotiations are political,
geographical and economic.
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Political Circumstances:
Because of the multiple interests at play,
neighboring states do not necessarily share the same
views on the importance, need or urgency of maritime
delimitation.
A pair of states are lucky if they find out that
they share a mutual interest in identifying a
potentially delimitable area, and a similar degree of
urgency in negotiating an agreement. Thus good
relations between governments will probably promote a
fair and prompt solution; ego U.S./Mexico and
Mexico/Cuba: Mexico maintains friendly relations with
both. Therefore, it is plain that the lack of formal
relations between countries, or the existence of poor
relations, would probably prevent the start of
negotiations; for example it is unthinkable that
Jordan would discuss maritime limits with Israel, or
that China would discuss maritime boundaries with
Taiwan.
The next most important political circumstance
concerns conflicting claims to territory from which
maritime zones may be claimed. e.g., Venezuelan
claims to western Guyana. These countries cannot
begin to draw . their maritime boundary until the
sovereignty question is settled. Conflicting claims
to territory are always a fruitful source of
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disagreement and ill will, and the difficulties are
exacerbated when the disputed territory. would allow a
successful claimant to make claims to potentially
valuable seas and seabed.
Geographical Circumstances:
Geographical circumstances which might make
negotiations difficult include:-
a) The problem of deciding whether a feature
standing above high tide ceases to be a rock and can
be considered an island. Art. 121 of the 1982
Convention states that an island is a naturally
-formed area of land surrounded by water, which is
above water at high tide. The article also confirms
that states may claim all maritime zones from such
features. The final part of the article provides that
rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or
economic life of their own may be used to claim
territorial waters, but shall have no continental
shelf of their own. There is no other indication of
how to distinguish rocks from islands or what entails
an economic life of their own. It is apparent that
decisions about the status of features which might be
rocks or islands will have to be decided between the
negotiators.
b) The next geographical circumstance which might
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complicate maritime boundary negotiations concerns
the nature of the continental shelf/seabed shared by
two adjacent or opposite states. The 1982 Convention
in Art. 76 permits a state to claim the continental
shelf which extends throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory, without providing
any guidance on how that natural prolongation will be
determined. The continental shelf of the Convention
is a legal abstraction which does not reflect the
complexity of the world's continental margins. Thus
it is left to the negotiators to solve this problem.
Economic Circumstances:
If there is a marked disparity in wealth and
resources between two states, the poorer state may
argue for the lion's share of a disputed zone, or at
the very least the poorer country might try to
persuade the richer state to discount part of the
richer state's claims.
Negotiations might be made more difficult if the
economic potential of a disputed area is high, or is
totally unknown. If the overlap formed by two claims
is known to be valuable in terms of reserves of
petroleum or natural gas, both countries will be
reluctant to compromise until each has fully tested
the resolve of the other state. Conversely, if the
value of the disputed zone is totally unknown, the
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uncertainity
countries to
about what is at stake will encourage
try to strike the hardest bargain
possible.
In every case the critical element is always the
attitude of states towards the question. If
governments approach the issue in a spirit of
conciliation, then the apparently serious
difficulties associated with potentially rich
continental margins may be readily overcome.
Conversely, if governments approach the matter with a
determination to secure their preferred solution,
then even trivial difficulties can be magnified into
apparently impassable obstacles. (15)
Principles and Methods:
For over three decades international diplomats and
jurists have attempted to develop maritime boundary
delimitation principles with broa~ if not universal
applicability. Two basic elements, however, have
frustrated the pursuit to establish a definitive set
of delimitation rules. First, and foremost no two
boundary situations are identical; all boundary
regions are unique, in that there are differences in
coastline configuration, seabed geomorphology and
geology, and in economic dependence. Thus related to
the geographical perspective there is also the
difference in the pattern of marine resources
distribution. These and other related characteristics
should be considered in a boundary delimitation.
Therefore, the delimitation method that may provide
an equitable and reasonable boundary solution in
boundary region one may create, due to the different
geographical and special circumstances, an
inequitable line in boundary region two. (16)
A second basic element is that new marine regions
are coming under national jurisdiction. To a certain
extent the delimitation of offshore maritime
boundaries reflects a continuum of experiences gained
from state practice relating to land boundaries and
then to near shore limits. (17) certain old practices
may be retained, but due to the nature of the new
zones, particularly to the distances involved, a
change in emphasis and technique will most likely be
forthcoming. But Art. 83 of the 1982 Convention
remains vague and is sUbject to interpretation. This
may not be bad since there must be a certain amount
of flexibility, due in part to the geographical and
special circumstance uniqueness of boundary regions,
in the process of boundary delimitation. (18)
There does not exist a measuring rod good enough as
to split principle from method in maritime
delimitation. Certain publicists diplomats and
cartographers have applied the term "principle" to
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categorize the equidistant or median line, wherein
"equidistant" is but a cartographic method (or at the
best, a rule for the delimitation of maritime space),
but definitely not a principle to be confounded
erroneously or on purpose, with a legal principle.
The International Court of Justice in the North Sea
case and the Tunisa/Libya case ruled that the
equidistant method cannot be considered a rule of the
law. (19)
Process Of Maritime Boundary Delimitation:
Questions that may be asked in any maritime
boundary delimitation are:
1) What function would the boundary serve, i.e.,
would it serve the interest of security or defense or
is it for economic considerations?
2) What factors should be taken into consideration
for the purpose of delimitation?
a) Geomorphological considerations:
- proximity to the coast
-appurtenance to offshore areas
-natural features, e.g., islands or a trench
-proportionality, e.g., ratio of length of
coastlines.
b) Geological/natural prolongation, i.e., if the
continental shelf is a continuation of the land mass.
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c) Resource interest/economic interest:
- unity of deposits and fish stocks
usage, i.e., historical and continuing
patterns
- acquiesence and conduct of the states.
d) Environmental considerations, i.e., ocean uses
may have effects on coastal areas and vice-versa.
e) Prior governmental activities in boundary area,
e.g., in the Tunisia/Libya case - the concession line
was used. (20)
The Methods Applied To Delimit Maritime Space Have
Been Classified As Follows:
1) Equidistance - by applying a median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points
of the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea of each of the two states is
measured.
2) Prolongation of the general direction of the
land boundary or the coast.
3) Line perpendicular to the coast at the land
boundary.
4) Parallel or meridian of the terminus of land
frontier.
5) Modified equidistance - using the biscetor of
angles and then drawing a parallel line to a known
point. (21)
1~
Case Law:
It is proposed here to examine in some detail
jUdgments of the International Court of Justice,
which are relevant to the delimitation of Trinidad
and Tobago boundaries between Venezuela, Grenada, and
Barbados.
The Anglo-Nowegian Fisheries Case (1951)
The dispute involved the validity in international
law of the Royal Norwegian Decree of 1935 of the
baseline system, delimiting the Norwegian Fisheries
Zone. (22)
By ten votes to two the International Court of
Justice declared, "that the method employed for the
delimitation of the fisheries zone by the Royal
Nowegian Decree, 1935 is not contrary to
international law." (23)
Part 1 of the Norwegian Counter-Memorial, contained
an investigation of the geographic, economic and
historic elements involved in the case. It pointed
out that the sole economic basis for this outpost of
civilization was the thousand-year old fisheries.
From time immemorial, the inhabitants of these
regions had carried on their fisheries even far
outside the zone laid down by the 1935 decree. (24)
1~
The JUdgment
The decision rendered on December 18, 1951, by the
International court of Justice resulted in a jUdgment
completely in favor of Norway. In a last
consideration reaching beyond purely geographical
factors, the Court recognized "that of the economic
interests peculiar to a region, the reality and
importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long
usage."(25) The vital economic interests of the
coastal population involved were very important
realities in the Court's consideration, and this was
repeatedly stated in the decision.
The historical factor was, together with the
geographical, economic and other factors, considered
as evidence of the important needs and realities
lying behind the Norwegian claims, and was thus one
of the factors to be taken into account in applying
the general principles of international law to a
particular case. Considering this very ancient and
peaceful usage, together with the vital needs of the
population, the Court found this line a reasonable
one. (26)
The importance of the decision of the Court for the
parties involved is obvious. It solves a serious
dispute which for more than forty years had existed
between two friendly nations, and settles questions
of the most vital interest for Norway.
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The Court emphasized the need for flexibility in
the rules of international law governing
delimitation. Considerations to be taken into account
are those such as the vital economic interest of the
regions involved, the practical needs and the local
requirements of the coastal population, and the
historic element in the case as a proof of such
needs. (27)
It seems only natural that the Court in this
regard has not stated all the elements which may be
of importance in the individual case. The elements
expressely mentioned were elements of actual
importance in the case pending before the Court. In
other cases new facts and elements may play an
important role and the intrinsic value of the
elements mentioned may vary in each individual case.
This case is relevant as a precedent for the
delimitation of Trinidad and Tobago boundary because
the question of economic interest peculiar to a
region was considered and given to this criteria.
U.K. and Northern Ireland vs. Iceland Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case, 1974
On April 14, 1972 the British Embassy in the
Netherlands instituted proceedings with the
International Court of Justice against the Republic
of Iceland. The dispute concerns the then proposed
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extension by the government of Iceland of its
fisheries jurisdiction to 50 miles from baselines
round its coast. The U.K challenged this extension
stating that it is contary to international law. (28)
Iceland did not take part in any phase of the Court
proceedings. In a letter dated May 29, 1972, the
government of Iceland informed the Court that it
regarded the exchange of notes between the government
of Iceland and the government of the U.K. dated March
11, 1961 as terminated. In its view there was no
basis under the statute for the Court to excerise
jurisdiction in the case. As it considered the vital
interest of the people of Iceland to be involved, it
was not willing to confer jurisdiction on the Court
in any case involving the extent of the fishery
limits of Iceland, an agent would not be appointed to
represent the government of Iceland. Notwithstanding
the Court's jUdgment of Feburary 2, 1973, in which
the Court decided that it had jurisdiction to
entertain the U.K.'s application and to deal with
the merits of the dispute, the government of Iceland
maintained the same position with regard to the
subsequent proceeding.
For the case the Court looked at the law passed in
1948 by the Atheling (the Parliament of Iceland)
entitled, "Law concerning the scientific conservation
of the continental shelf fisheries" containing inter
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alia the following provision. "It is well known that
the economy of Iceland depends almost entirely on
fishing in the vicinity of its coasts "(29)
On July 14, 1971 the Government of Iceland issued a
pOlicy statement in which it was stated:
" the extension of fisheries jurisdiction
to 50 nautical miles from the baselines would be
effective on Sept. 1, 1972."(30)
The Court stated that, "the delimitation of sea
areas has always an international aspect, it cannot
be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal
state as expressed in its municipal law. Although it
is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a
unilateral act, because only the coastal state is
competent to undertake it, the validity of the
delimitation with regard to other states depends upon
international law."(31)
There can be no doubt of the exceptional dependence
of Iceland on its fisheries. That exceptional
dependence was explicitly recognised by the applicant
in the exchange of notes on March 11, 1961; and the
Court has also taken judicial notice of such
recognition, by declaring that it is:
"necessary to bear in mind the exceptional
dependence of the Icelandic nation upon coastal
fisheries for its livehood and economic dependence."
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(32)
JUdgment:
By ten votes to four, the court found that the
fisheries extension of 50 miles from the baselines
are not opposable to the government of the U.K. Thus
economic dependence was taken into consideration in
coming to this decision.
The North Sea Case
This case is relevant to any issue with regard to
the continental shelf between Trinidad and Tobago and
Venezuela, Grenada and Barbados. In the jUdgment the
1958 Convention on the continental Shelf is examined,
and the question of delimitation of the continental
shelf is considered both if the provisions of Article
6 were applied and vice versa - e.g., a state not
being a party to a convention.
The task before the Court was to determine the
principles and rules to be applied in the
delimitation of the continental shelf boundary
between Germany and Denmark, and Germany and the
Netherlands in the North Sea.
The Court in its jUdgment, stressed that a coastal
state has rights over those areas of the continental
shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its
land territory. It held:
a) That the equidistance method for delimiting the
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continental shelf between adjacent or opposite states
was not a binding rule of customary international
law. The principles of international law governing
the delimitation of a common shelf are that such
delimitation should form the subject of an agreement
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between the states concerned, arrived at in
accordance with equitable principles.
b} That the delimitation in question should be
carried out in accordance with these principles
taking into account all relevant circumstances and in
such a way so far as possible, as to leave to each
party all those parts of the continental shelf that
constitute the natural prolongation of its land
territory under the sea. (33) Germany, one of the
parties in this case, was not a contracting party to
the 1958 continental Shelf Convention. (34)
The Court therefore had to . find what general
principles of law would apply, i. e. , what is the
customary international law on this sUbject. The
Court held that:
"The Geneva Convention did not embody or
crystallize any pre-extising or emergent rule of
customary law, according to which the delimitation of
continental shelf areas between adjacent/opposite
states must, unless the parties agree, be carried out
on an equidistance special circumstances basis." The

rule of Article 6 was a convent:ional rule and the
equidistance method is not e mandatory rule of
international law. (35)
The Court had to indicate tl";H rules of the law
concerning which methods should be used for effecting
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the delimitation. The Court found, that the
"delimitation must be the object of agreement between
the states concerned, and that such agreement be
arrived at in accordance wi1:h t~quitable principles. 11
(emphasis added) (36).
The Court tried to define the rule of equity:
Equity does not necessarily imply equality." (37)
..
Judgment
The Court by eleven votes to six decided that:
"Delimitation is to be effected by agreement in
accordance with equitable principles, and taking
account of all relevant circumstances " (38)
The factors to be considered in negotiating a
boundary area:-
1) The general configuration of the coast ..... as
well as .•• any special or unusual features.
2) the physical, geological, and natural
resources of the continental shelf areas involved.
3) Proportionality - i.e., length of the coastline
to the continental shelf. (39)
As a result of this decision, the agreed boundary
by the parties were not extensions of the
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equidistance boundaries already delimited, but some
other line beginning at the terminus of the partial
boundaries and extending Germany's jurisdiction over
a portion of the North Sea continental shelf out to
the median line between the continent and the
U.K. (40)
U.S.jCanada - The Gulf Of Maine Case
The Claims:
At the outset, the U.S. laid claims to all of
George's Bank whereas Canada sought a delimitation
line which would secure for it the eastern portion of
the Bank, where an important part of the fishing
takes place. Both parties requested the Chamber of
the International Court of Justice to make a decision
to be, "determined on the basis of the applicable law
in accordance with equitable principles, taking
account of all the relevant circumstances, in order
to achieve an equitable result," (41) and not ex
aequo et bono. (42) The half-a-Ioaf strategy adopted
by Canada immediately created the appearance of
reasonableness - an image which Canada carefully
cultivated throughout its written and oral
presentations to the Chamber. Such a strategy had a
major impact on the majority decision as evidenced by
the final delimitation line, giving Canada the
northeastern portion of George's Bank. (43)
The final statement of the majority states,"a
decision which would have assigned the whole of
George's Bank to one of the parties might possibly
have entailed serious economic repercussions for the
other."(44)
Economic Dependence: Canada's Counter - Memorial
Indeed, Canada's main pitch to the Chamber centered
on the economic dependence of the relatively poor
southwestern part of Nova Scotia upon the fishing
industry, particularly upon the catch from George's
Bank. (45)
Canada asserted that the loss of access to George's
Bank would knock out one of the central pillars of
the fishery, which forms the 'edifice' upon which
'human life is built,' (46) in southwest Nova Scotia,
citing the loss of 3,000 jobs, unemployment for 1,200
scallop fishermen, the loss of some forty million
dollars annually, as opposed to the u.S losing only
$10 million with a bristling and 'diversified economy
of New England, placing in jeopardy the livelihoods
of 1,000 small boat fishermen and also the loss of
5,000 jobs at fish plants. Canada argued that loss of
access to the Bank would reflect throughout the
secondary industries of boatbuilding and supplies,
and eventually spread throughout the entire economic
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base of Nova scotia. (47)
After painting a bleak picture of the economic
disaster which would befall this already depressed
economy if the Court decided to award all of George's
Bank to the U.S, Canada contended that in contrast,
the economy of New England would hardly be affected
by awarding Canada the eastern half of the Bank,
because New England's economy is far less dependent
upon the fishing industry.
Equitable criteria
What is the difference between the terms,
"equitable principles" as used by the parties, and
"equitable criteria" which is used by the Chamber.
Both terms apparently can be used interchangeably,
but for reasons of clarity the Chamber preferred the
latter. (48)
It suggested that the term "principles" connotes
rules of customary law which, because they are law,
would have to be applied in each case. On the other
hand, "criteria," are below the level of rules or
principles of law, and therefore need only be applied
where the particular circumstances make them
appropriate. (49)
The Chamber stressed that:
"The criteria in question are not themselves rules
of law and therefore mandatory in different
161
situations, but 'equitable,' or even 'reasonable
criteria,' and that what international law requires
is that recourse be had in each case to the
criterion, or the balance of different criteria,
appearing to be most appropriate to the concrete
situation. (50)
The degree of "equitableness" of the criteria will
vary with the circumstances of each case, and will
have different results from case to case.
As with the equitable criteria, no one method is
intrinsically appropriate, nor are there any that
must receive priority. The appropriateness of a
method is determined solely by the particular
circumstances in any given situation, although
"certain methods are easier to apply ......• because
of their almost mechanical operation, they are less
likely to entail doubts and arouse controversy
there is no single method which intrinsically brings
greater justice or is of greater practical
usefulness."(S1)
The Chamber did consider the economic geography
arguments as being 'other criteria' - criteria which
it declared not 'equitable' - in order to ascertain
whether these other criteria rendered the
delimitation (which had been achieved by applying
equitable criteria) somehow 'radically inequitable.'
The Chamber defined inequitable here as "likely to
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entail castastrophic repercussions for the livelihood
and economic well-being of the population of the
countries concerned."(52)
The Chamber concluded that its delimitation did
indeed provide an "equitable" result for these stated
reasons:
a) Canada retained its scallop fishing grounds on
the north eastern end of George's Bank and therefore,
the economy of southwestern Nova scotia would not
suffer.
b) The u.s. similarly kept its scallop fishing
grounds in the vicinity of the Great south Channel.
(53)
c) Both countries retained their lobster fishing
grounds on the northeastern and southwestern parts of
the bank.
Analysis of JUdgment:
JUdge Gros in his dessent charged that the Chamber
first determined the final result, and then developed
the means to reach that result. (54)
The Chamber thus decided to split the Bank. Clain
Levi's, view was; "whether the decision itself or the
means by which it was made came first does not really
matter. If the delimitation line arrived at by means
of applying equitable criteria did not result in
splitting George's bank, the Chamber in applying
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these economic criteria not found to be equitable
would have corrected the delimitation line so that it
split the bank, in order to achieve a 'equitable
result.' Thus, the same result is achieved whether
these 'other criteria' are taken into account at the
end of the process or at the beginning." (55)
If this analysis is valid, then the final
delimitation was ultimately chosen by "considerations
of a political and economic character," which the
Chamber initially discarded because such
considerations called for a decision ex aequo et bono
rather than one based on law. (56)
This analysis leads back to JUdge Gros' main
concern that the law of delimitation today is really
one without supporting "guard rails to the use of the
concept of equity," (57) and therefore, not
"controlled equity," but rather, "equity left,
without any objective elements of control, to the
wisdom of the judge reminding us that equity was once
measured by 'the chancellor's foot. '''(58)
If JUdge Gros is right, and the law of delimitation
has been reduced to a question of sUbjective equity,
then negotiating an agreement of a delimitation line
has been made at once more difficult because of the
absence of legal guidelines, and yet more certain,
because nations will prefer agreement to 'roll - the
dice jUdical discretion. Further, if the
dispute does
the ability
go to adjudication,
to persuade a judge of the
becomes the primary
delimitation
advocacy
'equity' of one's case
concern. (59)
The Federal and Provincial officials of Canada
claimed a victory and said that the decision ensures
the continuation of the scallop industry at the same
level, and may lead to an increase in ground fish and
lobster catches. (60)
Therefore Canada has 'done good.' Thus canada has
emerged the clear winner in the dispute. Therefore,
'economic dependence' helped in the decision, via
subtle implication of the Chamber.
The United states has accepted the chamber's
decision, but not without harbouring, and exhibiting,
bitter disappointment. A spokeman for the New England
fishing industry estimated that its fishermen will be
denied access to as much as 9,000 square nautical
miles of the most lucrative part of Georges Bank,
reducing the U.s. harvest of haddock by 30%, of
pollock by 25%, and of redfish, scallops and
yellowtail flounder by 20% - all of which, in turn,
would drive up prices to the American consumer. (61)
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Chapter 6: Construction and Analysis of Boundary
Lines:
It would be useful to begin this section by
referring once more to the reservation of Venezuela
with respect to the 1958 Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf. The reservation reads:
"In signing the present Convention, the
Republic of Venezuela declares with reference to
Article 6 that there are special circumstances to be
taken into consideration in the following areas: the
Gulf of Paria insofar as the boundary is not
determined by existing agreements and in zones
adjacent thereto; the area between the coast of
Venezuela and the island of Aruba; and the Gulf of
Venezuela. "(1) (emphasis added)
The "zones adjacent thereto," are defined in
Chapter four as the study areas a, b, and c. The
economic boundary lines will be constructed in this
section for each of these zones as it pertains to
Trinidad and Tobago's approach on delimitation.
1) Economic Maritime Boundary Line in Zones Band C.
This boundary is on the south coast of Trinidad and
Tobago with Venezuela and also on east coast of
Trinidad and Tobago with Venezuela.
Venezuela/Trinidad and Tobago economic boundary line.
----
166
The Starting point of construction is Point A,
(6~0' Wand 9° 5~ N), which is chosen as the closing
point for the Serpents Mouth. Point A1is also a point
on the petroleum concession boundary line of Trinidad
and Tobago used since 1969.
Point 0 (590 54'W and 90 58'N) which is the
end of the concession line is extended perpendicular
to the closest point of the 1,600 fathom or the 2,909
metre isobath to point y~ The choice of the 1,600
fathom line or 2,909 metres isobath was due to the
developments in the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, wherein Article 76 para.5
states:
The fixed points comprising the line of the
outer limits of the continental shelf on the sea-bed,
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shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breath of the territorial
sea is measured or shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles from the 2,500 metre isobath, which is a line
connecting the depth of 2,500 metres.
So the choice of the 1,600 fathom line or
2,909 metre isobath is in accordance with the above
statement, of not exceeding 100 nautical miles from
the 2,500 metre isobath.
The line is considered to be the
equidistant line between Venezuela and Trinidad and
Tobago; with this line the coast of Venezuela is
given full effect.
At Punta Playa which is the hypothetical
territory boundary line between Venezuela and Guyana,
12 mile territorial sea arcs are drawn. Point Z is
the 12 mile arc at Punta Playa and point H is the 12
mile arc at Punta Baja.
Point A is connected to Point H which is then
connected to Point z.
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A modified equidistant line is then
constructed. This was accomplished, by determining
the line midway between the equidistant line Al~which
give the Venezuelan coast full effect, and an
equidistant line drawn without
Venezuelan coast.
regard to the
A.,X1 is the modified equidistant line and is
the economic boundary line in zones Band C.
This precedent was set in the united
Kingdom/France Continental Shelf Arbritation, 1978,
in which the Court drew the boundary by determining
the line midway between an equidistant line giving
the Scilly Islands full effect and an equidistant
line drawn without regard to the Scillies.(2)
2) Maritime Boundary Line in Zone A: this area is the
area north of Trinidad and Tobago and forms part of
the Margarita-Tobago continental shelf. The
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boundaries are constructed between
Barbados in this zone.
Grenada and
Grenada/Trinidad and Tobago economic boundary line.
The proposed boundary between Trinidad and
Tobago and Grenada is an equidistant line Al'~
Point A3is choosen as the starting point for
the boundary line, since it corresponds to the
starting point of the petroleum concession line used
by Trinidad and Tobago since 1969. This precedent was
set in the Tunisia/Libya case, in which the Court
delinated the first part of the line using the
concession lines utilized by Tunisia (1966) and Libya
(1968). (3)
Point As is also the tri-point between
Grenada, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago.
Point B~is the equidistant point between Pt.
Egmont in Grenada and Pt. T on the Trinidad and
Tobago archipelagic baseline.
Point C3 is the equidistant point between
Requim point in Grenada and Mt. Irvine on the
Trinidad and Tobago archipelagic baseline.
Point D3 is the equidistant point between
Birds Island in Grenada and The sisters on Trinidad
and Tobago archipelagic baseline.
Point D3 is extended to X3 which is the
tri-point between the Grenadines islands, Barbados
and Trinidad and Tobago.
If Trinidad and Tobago uses the petroleum
concession line as their boundary, they stand to
loose more than if the equidistant line is used.
since there is no fixed methodology as to when to use
the equidistant principle and the only advice given
by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention on boundary
delimitation is "to achieve an equitable solution."
Here the equidistant line is equitable and reasonable
to both Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada.
Barbados/Trinidad and Tobago Maritime Boundary Line.
The opposition of the coastlines is used to
justify selection of the median line. The points used
in the construction of the median line.
Point X3is the tri-point between Trinidad and
Tobago, Barbados and the Grenadines islands. It is
used as the end-point or the closing point for the
median line. To get this tri-point, saint Giles in
Trinidad and Tobago, Carlise bay in Barbados and Sail
Rock in the Grenandines is used.
Point Y~ is the equidistant point between
South Point in Barbados and Saint Giles Island in
Trinidad and Tobago.
Point Z~ is the equidistant point between
Kitridge Pt. in Barbados and Little Tobago in
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Trinidad and Tobago.
Point Z is
which is on the 1600
isobath.
extended
fathom
perpendicularly to W,
line or 2,909 metre
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Trinidad and Tobago approach's for these economic
boundaries is based on the rule of law that maritime
boundaries are to be "determined on the basis of the
applicable law in accordance with equitable
principles, taking account of all the relevant
circumstances, in order to achieve an equitable
result."(5)
The Applicable Law:
1) Reference to the 1958 Continental Shelf
Convention.
This Convention came into force on June 10,
1964. Venezuela signed the Convention on October 30,
1958 and ratified it on August 15, 1961 with
reservation to Article 6 on delimitation of the
continental shelf. This reservation is stated at the
beginning of this chapter.
Article 6 of the 1958 continental Shelf Convention
states:
"Where the same continental shelf is
adjacent/opposite to the territories of two or more
states whose coast are adjacent/opposite each other,
the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to
such states shall be determined by agreement between
them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another
boundary line is justified by special circumstances,
the boundary is the median line, every point of which
is equidistant from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial
sea of each state is measured." (6)
Venezuela's reservation states:
" .....• with reference to Article 6 there are
special circumstances to be taken into consideration
in the following areas •...• "(7)
It is clear that by implication Venezuela recognised
the validity of the Gulf of Paria Treaty insofar as
certain areas have been delimited and that the median
line principle prescribed in Article 6 is not
acceptable to Venezuela in the Gulf of Paria and in
the zones adjacent thereto.
Trinidad and Tobago acceded to this
Convention on July 11, 1968. Trinidad and Tobago did
not give notice of any objections or reservation on
acceding to the Convention and to date, has not
placed on record any objection to the Venezuelan
reservation. Therefore Trinidad and Tobago has
implicitly accepted the Venezuelan reservation with
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respect to ..... 'zones adjacent thereto.'
Trinidad and Tobago can use this reservation
to achieve its goal of an economic boundary line.
Trinidad and Tobago has the burden of proving the
existence of special circumstances. Venezuela did not
define what is meant by special circumstances in its
reservation. So Trinidad and Tobago in the opinion of
the author takes it to refer to the socio-economic
dependence of the nation on the petroleum in the
zones.
b) Reference to the 1982 Convention.
Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Grenada all
signed the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Venezuela was one of the countries which voted
against the 1982 Convention. (8)
Venezuela has objection to with respect to
Article 12 - Roadsteads, 24 Duties of Coastal
states, 15, 74 and 83 which provides for delimitation
with the Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone and
continental Shelf. (9) This is a similar approach
taken by Venezuela at the sessions before the 1958
Convention which was signed and ratified by Venezuela
with similar reservations. (10)
173
The applicable law
boundary between Trinidad
in the case of the
and Tobago/venezuela, in
zone Band C is the 1958 Convention.
In zone A the boundary between Trinidad and
Tobago/ Barbados/Grenada, the applicable law is the
1982 Convention. But both the 1958 and the 1982
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Convention have the same object, i. e. , the
delimitation of the boundary in accordance with
equitable principles.
2) In the concept of "equity," the economy of
Trinidad and Tobago is at stake. Trinidad and Tobago
argues that one must take cognizance of the relative
economic dependence of Trinidad and Tobago upon the
petroleum in these zones; about 80% of the total
output of oil in 1986 is from these offshore zones.
Land production is low and no new productive
land-based fields have been found for the last five
years. Therefore the well-being of Trinidad and
Tobago as a nation depends on the offshore oil in
these zones.
The economy of Venezuela would hardly be
affected if the economic line ~~ is awarded.
Venezuela's economy is far less dependent upon zone B
and C for its oil production. Most of its output
comes from the western part of the country. Lake
Maracaibo alone produces about 80% of Venezuela's
total output oil production; Falcon and Maturin areas
also produce a fair amount also. (11)
Venezuela's crude oil reserves jumped to 55.5
billion barrels at year end 1986 from 29.5 billion
barrels at year's end 1985.(12)
The increase partly reflects inclusion for
the first time of about 18 billion barrels of easily
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recoverable reserves in the Orinoco Heavy oil
belt. (13) Venezuela closed off this area using
straight baselines.
Presently only Trinidad and Tobago has
explored and is drilling in these zones. Venezuela
has made no attempt to even carry out exploration
studies in these areas.
Trinidad and Tobago point of view is that if
the line AX is thrown out and the equidistant method
used, Trinidad and Tobago stands to lose some U.5.$50
million annually from an already depressed economy.
Whereas Venezuela does not stand to lose much from
its bristling and diversified economy, since no
drilling or exploration is taking place in zone Band
C by Venezuela at present.
Grenada historically had shown no petroleum
interest in zone A. Its economy is based on
agriculture and tourism. There has been a 19%
increase in tourism in 1984 and the number of
visitors are steadily increasing each year. In 1985
there were 39,563 visitors with an average of
U.S.$110 spent each day. (14) The policy of the
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present government is to develop further the tourism
and agriculture industries. There is no policy to
exploit for petroleum in this area. Therefore the
equidistant line AX is equitable. The burden of proof
! ~
now lies with Grenada to prove otherwise.
Barbados is similar in some ways to Grenada.
In 1984 there were 362,470 visitors with an average
of U.S.$98 spent daily. (15) This economy is based on
tourism, agriculture and manufacturing. The
government is showing a great deal of interest in
zone A, since recently a subsidary of Mobil
Coporation is carrying out deep oil drilling
activities in Woodburne and in the area south east of
Barbados. (16) The line ~ using the equidistant
method is equitable, Barbados will have to prove
otherwise.
Reduction in size of these delimited areas
would knock out one of the central pillars of the oil
industry, which forms the 'backbone' upon which the
Trinidad and Tobago economy or human life is built.
About 50,000 jobs would be lost directly, (17) this
would reverberate throughout the secondary industries
of petrochemicals, maintaince,supplies and all other
related industries. This would eventually pervade the
entire economic base of Trinidad and Tobago.
In the U.S.jCanada Judgment. The Chamber's
many and inconsistent reference to the economic
dependence argument throughout its decision reveals
its difficulty; as to what rational it would use for
taking the argument into account, but take it into
account it was determined to do. First the Chamber
pointed out that this argument and the 'gloomy'
prediction of the consequences that would occur if
Canadian fisherman were excluded from George's Bank,
involved considerations of a political and economic
character which the Chamber could not consider as
"equitable criteria" in its delimitation of the
line. (18) It implied, however, that it might consider
the socio-economic conditions in its test to ensure
that the line produced an equitable result. (19)
The Chamber appeared at first to dimiss this
entire argument as being legally irrelevant but the
human side of the jUdges in the final stages of the
majority decision could not help but give legal
cognizance to this economic impact plea:
What the Chamber woUld regard as a legitimate
scruple, " ... lies rather in concern lest the overall
result, even though achieved through the application
of equitable criteria and the use of appropriate
methods for giving them concrete effect, should
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unexpectedly be revealed as radically inequitable,
that is to say, as likely to entail castastrophic
repercussions for the livelihood and economic
well-being of the population of the countries
concerned. "(20)
Therefore, in the final result, the Chamber's
delimitation line assured the continuation of
Canada's overall economic dependence upon George's
Bank fishing. This is the precedent set on which
Trinidad and Tobago is drawing.
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In
the Court
stated:
the Anglo-Nowegian Fisheries Case (1951),
recognised the economic interest and
is one consideration not to
region, the reality and
clearly evidenced by long
beyond
economic
"Finally, there
be overlooked, the scope
geographical factors;
interests peculiar to a
importance of which is
usage."(21)
of
that
which extends
of certain
3) Conduct of the Parties - Acquiescence.
Zone A is part of what is known as the
Margarita-Tobago shelf. This shelf is described as
one of great petroleum importance areas in this
shelf have been leased.
Trinidad and Tobago apparently acting in
accordance with its general policy, (22) and its
continental Shelf Act (23), has leased and divided
certain areas for competitive bidding, (24) charts
and maps have been pUblished, (25) and to date there
are no protests or objections from Grenada or
Barbados.
Zones Band C, areas east and southeast of
point X (designated in the 1942 treaty), in the
Serpent's Mouth and the Atlantic ocean. These areas
have vast potential and are already being exploited
on a commercial basis. These areas have been leased
to companies for competitive bidding also. Charts and
maps have also been pUblished, indicating the leasing
areas to oil companies. (26)
Venezuela has not over the years and ever
since the first maps were published and distributed,
as well as reflected in Trinidad and Tobago
legislation, objected to the areas leased. No notice,
protest or objection has been received by the
government, in the light of this. It seems that
Venezuela, Grenada and Barbados have all acquiesced
in Trinidad and Tobago's actions.
This action is further supported by the fact
that Trinidad and Tobago has excercised sovereignty -
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to put it more forcefully, ownership - of these areas
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by leasing them to foreign oil companies and
collecting the revenues from the leasing and
exploration and exploitation of the resources in
them. (27) Therefore the current boundary shown on
the map 15, should not be changed in favor of
Venezuela but be re-defined and should be further
south or southeast of Trinidad in zone Band C, thus
the line AX is justified.
1 1
In the case of Grenada and Barbados the
equidistant line AX and XW should be used.
!3 3
As far back as 1958, Venezuela, through its
delegate at the Conference on the Law of the Sea
stated that,
"Venezuela could never accept the thesis that
rights could never be acquired by occupation in
international matters. There should be no recognition
of a prescriptive title to the detriment of new
countries now in full progress of development. (28)
However, Venezuela by its actions or non-action, does
not appear to have adopted this approach with its
relations with Trinidad and Tobago. The writer is of
the view that Trinidad and Tobago, relying upon
general principles of International Law governing
division of a common continental shelf, occupation
and prescription, has a strong case against
Venezuela, Barbados and Grenada in claiming the areas
leased and a little beyond.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion:
The purpose of this thesis, as stated in the
introduction, was to delimit the maritime boundaries
between Trinidad and Tobago /Venezuela /Grenada and
Barbados.
The study was based upon several assumptions.
First, special circumstances, i.e., the economic
dependence of Trinidad and Tobago on offshore oil on
the east and north coast of this country, as opposed
to Venezuela'~ larger reserves on the western part of
that country in the Gulf of Maracaibo and the eastern
side in the Orinoco delta. In the case of Barbados
historically, its economy is based on tourism and
agriculture.
The second assumption is that the
International Law regarding maritime boundary
delimitation was not a universally accepted,
systematic body of rules. Despite the efforts of the
negotiators at UNCLOS III to define the law of
maritime boundary delimitation there is no systematic
set of rules which can be applied in every case. The
controversy centers upon whether or not the concept
of "equitable principles," or the strict application
of the "equidistance method," with exceptions allowed
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only in certain "special circumstances," takes
precedence in the delimitation. The writer's opinion
is that each case in dispute should be considered and
judged on its own merits, having regard to its
peculiar circumstances.
The representative of Venezuela, at the 1982
Law of the Sea Conference in his amendment on April
15, 1982 stated as follows:
"Venezuela had maintained that questions
regarding the delimitation of ocean and undersea
spaces should be resolved by equitable agreement
among the parties concerned. Delimitation of that
kind had to take into account various questions of
jUdgment and factors that varied from case to case.
The practice of states showed that no single method
but rather a combination of methods had been used to
achieve an equitable solution in the majority of
agreements on delimitation of ocean space."(l)
That approach had in the last three years
produced satisfactory agreements between Venezuela
and four neighbouring states: the United states,
Netherlands, Dominican Republic and France. Those
agreements covered more than 50% of the areas that
Venezuela had to delimit. It is hoped that Venezuela
can reach equitable agreements with the other
neighbouring states as well.
Venezuela's position was based upon
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice
and recent arbitral awards. (2) The Trinidad and
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Tobago economic boundary line is also based on
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice.
The only concrete guidance provided in the
1958 continental Shelf Convention and the 1982
Convention in the articles on delimitation of the
continental shelf is that the ultimate goal of the
negotiations between the parties should be 'to
achieve an equitable solution.'
The 1982 International Court of Justice
decision between Tunisia and Libya on the continental
shelf clarifies the concept of 'equitable solution'
as follows:
"The result of the application of equitable
principles must be equitable •..• It is, however, the
result which is predominant. The principles are
subordinate to the goal."(3)
The Court also indicated that the application
of equitable principles involves, "to balance up the
various considerations which it regards as relevant
circumstances in order to produce an equitable
result."(4) Thus the relevant circumstances taken
into consideration in drawing the economic boundary
lines is the economic dependence of Trinidad and
Tobago on the offshore oil in the study areas.
It is now generally recognised that equity is
the rule of International Law to be applied to the
delimitation of the continental shelf. This principle
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is reflected in the 1969, North Sea Continental Shelf
Case, in the Arbitral Tribunal's decision in 1977 on
the continental shelf between France and the U.K. and
in the Tunisia/Libya case in 1982.
In the North Sea case the Court provided that
" ..... in this field it (equity) is precisely a rule
of law that calls for the application of equitable
principles. II (S) In the Tunsia/Libya case, the Court
stipulated that the "legal concept of equity is a
general principle directly applicable to law."(6)
Therefore, it is concluded that the words lion the
basis of international law" do not add any new
element to Article 83 of the 1982 Convention; in the
delimitation context, equity or equitable solution,
which already exists in the articles, is the rule of
law.
On the other hand the reference to
international law does not leave the door open to
introducing the equidistance method as a rule of
international law, nor does it lead to a presumption
in favor of equidistance or median line in relation
to other methods.
In the Tunisia/Libya case, the Court provides
that "treaty practice", as well as the history of
article 83 of the 1982 Convention, l~ads to the
conclusion that, "equidistance may be applied if it
leads to an equitable solution. If not, other methods
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the North
Court of
should be employed .... since equidistance is not, in
view of the Court, either a mandatory legal principle
or a method having some priviledged status in
relation to other methods."(?)
The same thinking is embodied in
Sea case and in the decision of the
Arbitration on the continental shelf between France
and the U.K.
The author saw it fit that using the
equidistance line between Trinidad and
Tobago/Grenada/Barbados leads to an equitable
solution. Therefore the lines AX and XW are proposed.
For the Trinidad and Tobago/Venezuela
boundary line AX is used because it produces an
equitable solution for both Trinidad and Venezuela.
Venezuela depends for its oil production from the
Gulf of Maracaibo, Falcon and the Orinoco Delta;
whereas Trinidad and Tobago depends for its oil
production from the eastern and northern offshore
areas.
As to the precedents set on economic
dependence, three cases were looked at in Chapter
five. In the Anglo- Nowegian Fisheries Case, the
vital economic interests of the coastal
population involved were very important realties in
the International Court of Justice consideration. In
the U.K.jlceland Fisheries case, economic dependence
1~
was taken into consideration in the decision. In the
U.S.jCanada case the Court also used economic
dependence in reaching a decision. This is shown when
the Court stated, " ..... a decision which would have
assigned the whole of George's bank to one of the
parties might possibly have entailed serious economic
repercussions for the other." The criteria used by
Trinidad and Tobago in its delimitation have been set
by court decisions.
The sUbject of maritime boundaries like the
sUbject of land boundaries, is a sensitive one and
should be handled carefully and with the
understanding of the opposite or different
viewpoints. The subject has assumed greater
importance because of the developments in the Law of
the Sea regarding the extent of a coastal state's
jurisdiction in the 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone
and the continental shelf, whose outer limits may
under certain circumstances exceed 200 miles.
In these zones, the coastal state enjoys
sovereign rights over the resources, as well as
exclusive jurisdiction and rights in other specified
matters. These may include oil and gas, fisheries,
energy, environmental control and other uses of the
sea.
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Accordingly,
of states haszones
the delimitation of maritime
to be done with due regard to
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this sensitivity and in an equitable and fair manner.
A single rule or method may not be
automatically or mandatorily applicable in all
circumstances, irrespective of the geographical and
other facts. A maritime boundary agreement, to be
durable, must be a fair and equitable one and take
into account the special circumstances in the area
relevant to the delimitation.
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Speech
Tobago,
In the 1987 Budget
Minister of Trinidad and
A.N.R. Robinson stated:
"The basic reality confronting Trinidad and
Tobago in 1987 is that, led by a government in power
for thirty years, we have failed to meet the
challenge of independence. We achieved political
independence in 1962 with an economy dependent on one
single resource oil. Twenty-five years later, we are
more than ever dependent on the vagaries of the
international oil market. We have failed to develop
an economy sufficiently diversified and sUfficiently
resilient to absorb or even cushion the shocks caused
by periodic crises on the international oil market."
Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela, Barbados and
Grenada have excellent relationship at all levels:
therefore this is a good time to commence
negotiations. Boundaries have to be defined because
with modern technology's rapid progess the mineral
resources in the continental shelf are no longer
outside the reach of mankind.
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